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I. INTRODUCTION
An integrated confidentiality system now pervades American dispute
resolution. This system was created over the course of decades by
legislatures, rule makers, and courts. Proponents of confidentiality have
long justified expansive secrecy by claiming that the benefits of
withholding litigation information outweigh any potential public harm.1
Recent evidence undermines this premise.2 In some of the most important
public-harms cases of the past two decades, critical health-and-safety
information was kept secret in court files.3 People died or were injured in
the meantime. It has also become apparent that consolidating cases in
multi-district litigation has the potential to accelerate and homogenize
confidentiality nationally.4 The recent evidence of these trends is
concerning and would prompt any conscientious observer to reconsider
the status quo.
This Article first considers the structure and impact of court
confidentiality. Much of the current system is driven by inertia, tradition,
and player incentives (in addition to formal rules). Next, the Article
examines some of the existing limitations on court confidentiality and
proposes a few alternatives. These proposals include new limitations on
private confidentiality agreements for litigation information, an
appropriately expanded role for the First Amendment in protective-order
disputes, and limitations on umbrella protective orders and sealing orders.

1. At least two prominent pro-confidentiality scholars of the 1990s contended
that evidence of widespread public harm flowing from confidentiality orders was, at
that time, lacking. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality
Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 464 (1991) (“Despite the widely publicized
instances of supposed cover-ups of hazards, hard data is generally lacking and the
critics’ broader assertions about widespread abuses may be validly questioned.”); see
infra text accompanying notes 89–90.
2. See, e.g., Benjamin Lesser, et al., How Judges Added to the Grim Toll of
Opioids,
REUTERS
(June
25,
2019,
1:00
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-judges/
[https://perma.cc/Q484-TUFF]; see also The Federal Judiciary in the 21st Century:
Ensuring the Public’s Right of Access to the Courts Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Internet, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 26, 2019)
(statement of Daniel R. Levine, Legal Correspondent, Thomson Reuters & Lisa
Girion, Reporter, Thomson Reuters) [hereinafter “Statement of Levine & Girion”].
3. Statement of Levine & Girion, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., U.S. J.P.M.L., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
(2018),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multi
district_Litigation-FY-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8AC-W2HU]; Daniel S.
Wittenberg, Multidistrict Litigation: Dominating the Federal Docket, ABA BUSINESS
OF LAW, (Feb. 19, 2020).
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II. CURRENT STRUCTURE AND IMPACTS OF COURT
CONFIDENTIALITY
The current system arose from player incentives. These incentives
keep many disputes out of court altogether, settled pursuant to private (but
judicially-enforceable) confidentiality agreements or submitted to private
arbitration. For disputes that do make it into a court, a web of procedural
rules, traditions, repeat-player relationships, and litigant preferences
provide ready confidentiality. Largely absent from the creation or
operation of these systems is the public.

A. Confidentiality Incentives
A vast amount of litigation information is kept from public view,
temporarily or permanently. This veil of secrecy justifiably obscures
benign private information, such as social security numbers, medical
records.5 But it also conceals information critically important to public
safety – the identity and location of pedophile priests, the poisoning of a
water supply, dangerous automobiles.6 While specific reasons for keeping

5. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a) (requiring redaction of information regarding
“an individual’s social-security number, taxpayer-identification number, or birth date,
the name of an individual known to be a minor, or a financial-account number”); cf.,
e.g., Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 62–63 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing privacy of
medical and psychiatric records).
6. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1986)
(reviewing district court’s issuance of protective order in a case involving allegations
that a company poisoned a town’s water supply); Annysa Johnson & Ellen Gabler,
Archbishops Struggled with Vatican over Ousting Priests, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
(July 2, 2013) https://archive.jsonline.com/news/religion/Cardinal-Dolansought-toprotect-money-from-claims-struggled-with-Vatican-to-defrock-abusers-b9943953z1213832541.html/ [https://perma.cc/ZJV7-MDQF] (describing how a “broad
protective order” kept information about pedophile priests from the public); Bill
Vlasic, Inquiry by G.M. Is Said to Focus on Its Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, (May 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/business/inquiries-at-gm-are-said-to-focus-onits-legalunit.html#:~:text=DETROIT%20%E2%80%94%20As%20General%20Motors%20f
aces,with%20knowledge%20of%20the%20inquiry [https://perma.cc/3356-SF9M]
(“G.M.’s unwillingness to share information it had about defective switches with
regulators most likely cost lives in accidents.”). In some circumstances, courts
rightfully protect the identity of minors, including the identities of their parents, from
disclosure in court proceedings. Cf. J.W. v. D.C., 318 F.R.D. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 2016)
(“[T]he Court finds that permitting Plaintiffs to proceed using only their initials is
warranted in this case, and that the right of public access is outweighed by Plaintiffs’
‘overriding interest’ in protecting J.W.’s identity and avoiding unnecessary publicity
concerning his disability.”); see also Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery:
Non-Party Access to Pretrial Information in the Federal Courts 1938-2006, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 817, 818–19 (2007); Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First
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information confidential vary from case to case, player incentives have
driven confidentiality into the DNA of modern American litigation.7
Much litigation, and pre-litigation, is asymmetrical, and the incentive
relationship is driven, at least in part, by this asymmetry. In personal
injury, employment, civil rights, and other contexts, defendants typically
have superior resources and access to information. Plaintiffs may have
little to no resources, and many rely on the resources of an attorney
retained on a contingent fee. Another asymmetry: defendants often face
repeating claims over the same or related conduct.8 Distributing thousands
of products, supervising thousands of employees, or employing policies
that affect thousands of people can create a significant volume of
litigation.9 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are typically in a one-off situation,
litigating a single case over a single injury (though their attorneys may
have multiple similar cases).10
In this reality, several incentives drive parties to keep information
confidential. First, company-defendants want to avoid the reputation
harm, and related commercial injury, caused by the release of confidential
information.11 This is true even if the defendant has a potential defense to
a claim (for instance, its product is not actually dangerous) because of the
risk that the media or public might misconstrue the information. Second,
defendants are incentivized to stifle similar claims, even if those claims
are meritorious.12 Assuming a repeating case context, potential claimants

Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1784–85
(2014).
7. See Dustin B. Benham, Tangled Incentives: Proportionality and the Market
for Reputation Harm, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 427, 438 (2018) (examining the incentives
driving discovery and confidentiality); cf. Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep
Secret Information Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 802–03 (2002) (noting examining the incentives in the
discovery-confidentiality context).
8. Cf., e.g., Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and
Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2206 (2014) (discussing
protective-order incentives in the repeating-claims context).
9. Many of these cases are now collected in multidistrict litigation. See
Wittenberg, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players
in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1449–50
(2017) (examining the phenomenon of repeat-player plaintiff attorneys in MDL
product-liability actions).
11. See Benham, supra note 7, at 440, (discussing the economic incentive to
avoid reputation harm); Koniak, supra note 7, at 802–03.
12. See, e.g., Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability
Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 772–74 (1990) (describing
how dissemination of discovery among similar cases may undermine defenses and
advocating against plaintiffs’ right to disseminate, to the extent such a right exists).
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could feed off information from the first case or other similar cases.13
More cases to defend means more money in defense costs and judgment
liability. Additionally, more cases – particularly meritorious cases – will
likely cause the defendant greater reputation injury. Third, the defendantcompany will have a strong incentive to protect its intellectual property.14
To the extent the design of a product or information about a process is
valuable, its public disclosure could eviscerate its value.15
Plaintiffs also have potentially strong incentives to keep litigation
information – even defendants’ information – secret. Because defendants
are often incentivized to keep litigation information from the public, the
plaintiff who obtains such information holds something of value to sell
back to the defendant at settlement.16 Indeed, parties to a settlement often
exchange money for a promise of silence from the plaintiff.17 But the
value in this type of bargain can only be realized if the underlying
information is not generally known. For if the information were widely
known, a defendant would never pay to keep it secret. Thus, plaintiffs
have an incentive to develop the maximum amount of damaging
information, keep it secret in the interim, and then sell that secrecy back

13. Protective orders, and other confidentiality mechanisms, may also impose
externalities on similar litigation when they restrict the flow of information between
cases. See, e.g., Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 310–11 (Iowa 2009)
(“When we add to the mix the time, money, and effort expended by counsel and
support staff for the Iowa plaintiffs in organizing and analyzing the information after
Microsoft produced it, the staggering cost of repeating the process in the Canadian
litigation comes even more sharply into focus.”); see also Benham, supra note 8, at
2206–08.
14. See, e.g., Bell v. Chrysler Corp., No. 3:99-CV-0139-M, 2002 WL 172643, at
*1–2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2002) (reviewing protective order of trade secret material in
design defect case); Cf., e.g., In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex.
1998) (holding that courts should enter appropriate protective order after determining
whether to order production of trade secret information); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G)
(permitting a court to issue a protective order to ensure that “a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be
revealed only in a specified way”).
15. In a common example, public disclosure of the formula for Coca-Cola would
cause the company irreparable harm. This is true because of two features of the
formula: Coca Cola takes substantial measures to keep it secret in the ordinary
business and the nature of the information has high intrinsic value. Cf., e.g., Marcus,
supra note 1, at 496; see also Benham, supra note 6, at 1824–25.
16. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom
of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 332 (1998) (“Hoping to prevent further
dissemination of [discovery] information, the defendant makes the plaintiff a generous
settlement offer, but only on the condition that the plaintiff returns all discovery
materials and promises not to discuss the case with the public or the media.”).
17. See id.
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to defendants for money.18 Additionally, the plaintiff will need to obtain
discovery to litigate her claim. Agreeing to broad confidentiality may
make this easier. According to some, opposing confidentiality sets up
grueling discovery fights with defendants who might otherwise offer to
produce information in exchange for a “standard” protective order.19
Moreover, confidentiality in the case may also suit the plaintiff’s
reputational interests. Imagine, for instance, that the plaintiff’s toxicology
screens at the time of the injury showed that the plaintiff had cocaine in
her system. A plaintiff would almost certainly want to keep this
information private.
In most litigation, this leaves one final player to account for – the
court. And courts, like litigants, have incentives to keep information
confidential.20 At the outset, there is the idea – true or not – that defendants
will more vigorously contest discovery in the absence of confidentiality.
Many courts loathe discovery fights and prefer the lubricating effect of a
blanket protective order.21 Moreover, courts are incentivized to resolve
cases on their dockets, and confidentiality has been recognized as an aid
to settlement.22 Additionally, many judges work admirably as stewards of
the public interest but see their primary role as resolving individual cases

18. See Benham, supra note 7, at 441 (“The value of reputation cost imposed
through discovery depends on the power of at least one party to publicly disclose the
information and the right of the party to contract away that power for something of
value (money, for example).”).
19. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 12, at 772–75 (contending that defendants
would more aggressively resist disclosure if faced with restrictions on protective
orders); Marcus, supra note 15, at 484–85 (“One basic problem is that presumptive
public access would disrupt orderly pretrial preparation by fomenting opposition to
broad discovery, forcing judges to resolve confidentiality issues . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 7, at 456 (examining court incentives to keep
litigation information confidential).
21. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427
(10th Cir. 1990) (“[S]tipulated ‘blanket’ protective orders are becoming standard
practice in complex cases.” (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.431 (2d
ed. 1985))); see also Model Stipulated Protective Order for Standard Litigation, N.D.
Cal.
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/forms/model-protectiveorders/CAND_StandardProtOrd.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT6U-F7XU] (last visited
Dec. 31, 2020) (hereinafter “N.D. Cal. Model Stipulated Protective Order”).
22. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 486 (1991) (contending that restrictions
on court confidentiality should not be allowed to “obscure the strong public interest
in, and policy objectives furthered by, promoting settlement.”).
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on the merits.23 Many are reticent to facilitate media investigations or be
a public repository for scandalous information.24
Thus, the typical players, in the typical case, simply are not
incentivized to litigate in public. On the other hand, the players with
incentives to make litigation information public are often absent.25 This
includes the media, citizen action groups, and even government.26 These
groups represent the public’s interest in knowing about danger and public
malfeasance. Such groups can intervene and seek the release of litigation
information.27 But the standards for succeeding in such an endeavor can
be daunting.28 The cost of litigation is high, beyond the reach, in many
cases, of media and public-interest organizations. Beyond the cost,
perhaps the biggest hurdle to third-party intervention is that third parties
simply do not know what they do not know about confidential litigation.29
It is true that the basic factual allegations (in most cases) will be
publicly available in the complaint, but the media is aware that those
allegations require little corroboration in advance of filing.30 Without

23. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1983) (noting the “assumption of the litigants and the
courts that discovery compels the disclosure of information solely to assist preparation
for trial.” (emphasis added)); Marcus, supra note 15, at 470 (the primary purpose of
courts is “to decide cases according to the substantive law”); but see Richard Zitrin,
The Judicial Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public Interest?, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2004) (arguing that courts have a substantial public role
in addition to private dispute resolution).
24. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
25. See Benham, supra note 7, at 458–60 (discussing third-party intervention
procedures and incentives).
26. See, e.g., Mike Spector, Jaimi Dowdell, & Benjamin Lesser, How Secrecy in
U.S. Courts Hobbles the Regulators Meant to Protect the Public, REUTERS (Jan. 16,
2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courtssecrecy-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/EQR4-4475 ] (“Judges have rarely shown
willingness to grant requests from plaintiffs, expert witnesses or news organizations
to share information with regulators or the public.”).
27. See, e.g., In re Dall. Morning News, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 298, 298–99 (Tex. 1999)
(per curiam) (describing attempt by newspaper to intervene and obtain access to
unfiled discovery and summary jury trial exhibits); cf. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999).
28. See, e.g., Spector, Dowdell, & Lesser, supra note 26 (“Judges have rarely
shown willingness to grant requests from plaintiffs, expert witnesses or news
organizations to share information with regulators or the public.”).
29. “David Friedman, a NHTSA official during the GM ignition-switch scandal,
told Reuters that court secrecy blunts regulators’ subpoena power because if
documents and other evidence are sealed, ‘how are you supposed to know about
them?’” Id.
30. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 22, at 479 (noting that pleadings are available for
public inspection even when unfiled discovery is not); cf., e.g., Brown v. Maxwell,
929 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[P]leadings, complaints, and briefs – while
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access to proof, sorting the wheat from the chaff in the court system is
quite difficult.31 Thus, while the media and the public have incentives to
seek access to information important to public safety and governance, the
practical hurdles to doing so remain quite high. As a result, third-party
intervention remains relatively infrequent.

B. Off Ramps: Avoiding Public Access Rights Through Private
Agreement
Pre-incident non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”) and arbitration
agreements keep important information out of court and out of public
view. Arbitration agreements, and some NDAs, are part of adhesion
contracts that precede any incident that might give rise to a dispute.
Sometimes, court rules even suggest or require the practice.32
Pre-incident NDAs effectively muzzle potential claimants – often
employees with a harassment claim – and arbitration agreements remand
entire disputes to a private forum. These disputes are routinely settled,
also on a promise of secrecy, or litigated to a conclusion in private
arbitration.33 Often, no public docket or documents exist to alert the public
that a dispute ever happened. Similarly, post-incident NDAs are often
coupled with settlement agreements to keep potential litigation
information secret in exchange for money.34

supposedly based on underlying evidentiary material – can be misleading. Such
documents sometimes draw dubious inferences from already questionable material or
present ambiguous material as definitive.”); but see Lesser et al., supra note 2 (“[A]s
lawyers began fleshing out their cases against the opioid industry in amended
complaints, they redacted details of the companies’ conduct.”).
31. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 52–53.
32. Cf., e.g., Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing
the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J.
1631, 1653–54 (2015) (“Debate exists about how much ADR is used in courts, as well
as what metrics to use to assess its impact. Yet, on two measures – the volume of
rulemaking and the privatization of court-based interactions – the results are
unambiguous: courts have promulgated hundreds of rules governing various forms of
ADR, and those rules do not protect rights of the public to observe the processes or to
know much about the results.”).
33. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement
Restrictions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1482 (2006)
(noting the incentives of parties to use confidential arbitration in lieu of a public court
system). But see Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth,
54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1273 (2006) (“[A]t both the state and the federal level,
present law provides little reliable support for arbitration confidentiality when
arbitration communications are sought for purposes of discovery or admission at
trial.”).
34. See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-
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The impact of this trend has been exceedingly visible in a parade of
recent sexual misconduct cases.35 In many of these cases, powerful
potential defendants reportedly used NDAs and settlement agreements
leveraged upon less-powerful claimants to keep information about alleged
misconduct secret.36 In several cases, the alleged misconduct continued
for decades, often under the shield of contractual secrecy promises.37
The impact of pre-litigation confidentiality agreements may never be
fully known. Many of these arrangements take place in lawyers’ offices,
leaving no trace in court files and courtrooms. And potential defendants
are quite adept at structuring the agreements to keep the disputes
permanently out of public view.38 Some NDAs include provisions for
payments over years. Presumably, a breach of the contract’s secrecy
provision would stop the payments, giving the victim a strong incentive to
remain silent. Other agreements include a requirement that the claimant
execute an affidavit denying that the potential defendant committed the
alleged misconduct.39 Upon breach of the secrecy provision, the affidavit
could be provided to the press or court to discredit the alleged victim’s
allegations. Some agreements have reportedly included provisions for
electronic device and email password turnover, apparently to ensure that
all evidence of misconduct ends up in the possession of the potential
defendant’s lawyers, presumably to be secured or destroyed.40
All the while, the public has no seat at the table in structuring these
private agreements – indeed the public, in many cases, does not know the
table exists.41 Under the current status quo, repeat offenders remain free
to victimize others so long as they have the wealth and sophistication to
weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma.cc/U355-DFE5] (describing movie
mogul’s use of settlement agreements to keep sexual assault allegations secret).
35. See, e.g., id. (describing movie mogul’s use of settlement agreements to keep
sexual assault allegations secret).
36. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, Jeffrey Epstein’s Scandal of Secrecy Points to a
Creeping Rot in the American Justice System, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019, 7:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeffrey-epsteins-scandal-of-secrecypoints-to-a-creeping-rot-in-the-american-justice-system/2019/06/14/3f100a44-8ecf11e9-adf3-f70f78c156e8_story.html [https://perma.cc/7Z8H-RSLY] (“According to
superlawyer David Boies, ‘dozens’ of women who could give testimony about being
sexually assaulted as girls by mysterious financier Jeffrey Epstein are silenced by
settlements they reached with their alleged assailant.”); see also Loune-Djenia Askew,
Confidentiality Agreements: The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act, the #metoo
Movement, and Signing Away the Right to Speak, 10 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L.
REV. 61, 63 (2019) (discussing use of NDAs in sexual misconduct cases).
37. See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 34.
38. See, e.g., id. (describing elaborate confidentiality agreement to silence
alleged victim).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Cf. Benham, supra note 7, at 461–62.
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craft an adequate contract.42 Several states have passed new laws to
restrict these practices, as discussed in more detail in Sub-subpart III.A.3,
infra, but some question their efficacy.43
Sexual misconduct cases, sadly, are the tip of the iceberg of
widespread confidentiality agreements affecting public health and
safety.44 Potential defendants often have little reason to alert the public to
potential health-and-safety risks, and claimants are fearful of the
implications following a breach, often having faced long odds to get a fair
settlement in the first place.45

C. The Ball Rolls Down the Hill: Tradition, Inertia, and
Confidentiality
Once a case is filed, tradition and inertia also drive litigation
confidentiality. Like a ball rolling down a hill, confidentiality is injected
into cases early, usually in the form of a stipulated protective order, and
often gathers enough speed to overcome legal hurdles meant to stop
pervasive secrecy later.46

1. Easy Access to Protective Orders
Early in litigation, procedural rules, widespread local practices, and
player expectations work together like a well-oiled machine to keep
unfiled discovery confidential.47 In jurisdictions across the country, courts
have standing (or “suggested”) protective orders.48 The orders often
42. See, e.g., Von Drehle, supra note 36.
43. Elizabeth A. Harris, Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts to Ban Secret Settlements
Stop
Short,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
14,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-movement-nda.html
[ https://perma.cc/2AVR-KKVM] (highlighting state law efforts to limit secret
settlements in the sexual assault context).
44. Cf., e.g., Richard Zitrin, Time to Outlaw Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/opinion/letters/sex-abuse-secretsettlements.html [https://perma.cc/PAJ2-DWHR] (“#MeToo secrecy is only the tip of
this iceberg. For years, companies with deadly products have used hush money to
force plaintiffs to agree to secret settlements . . . . This keeps the truth about deadly
defects from public scrutiny, sometimes for decades.”).
45. Cf., e.g., Farrow, supra note 34.
46. Cf., e.g., Seth Katsuya Endo, Contracting for Confidential Discovery, 53
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1249, 1275 (2020) (giving “a window into what courts are doing
in their everyday practice by examining a set of 100 orders on proposed stipulated
protective orders from January 2018.”).
47. See generally Benham, supra note 7.
48. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Model Stipulated Protective Order,
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/forms/model-protectiveorders/CAND_StandardProtOrd.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BZU-QXL8] (last visited

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/6

10

Benham: Foundational and Contemporary Court Confidentiality

2021] ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS ON COURT CONFIDENTIALITY

221

include provisions that allow the parties themselves to designate discovery
material as “confidential.”49 In some cases, using these “umbrella”
provisions, parties designate entire document productions, entire
deposition transcripts, or engage in other blanket designation practices.
Umbrella confidentiality designations preclude disclosure absent a party
challenge.50 But for reasons already discussed, parties are often
unmotivated to engage in these contests on behalf of the interests of an
absent public. Indeed, many protective orders even forbid disclosure to
government authorities, including regulators tasked with overseeing the
specific product or risk at issue in the case.51
Even when courts do not enter a standing protective order, parties
routinely stipulate to confidentiality to keep discovery moving.52 Like the
5/18/2020); see also The Honorable Craig Smith et. al., Finding a Balance Between
Securing Confidentiality and Preserving Court Transparency: A Re-Visit of Rule 76a
and Its Application to Unfiled Discovery, 69 SMU L. REV. 309, 342–43 (2016) (“A
standardized protective order can require the party seeking to expand the protection of
the protective order to show that dissemination would harm the proprietary value of
the confidential information. Going further the protective order could include a
provision giving the judge authority to sign a protective order only after
acknowledging that none of the discovery materials, with limited exceptions, concern
matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public.”); but see Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The District
Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to oversee the discovery process and to
determine whether filings should be made available to the public. It certainly should
not turn this function over to the parties . . .”).
49. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Model Stipulated Protective Order, at 3–4; see also
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.432 (4th ed. 2004).
50. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427
(10th Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Spector, Dowdell, & Lesser, supra note 26 (“In an analysis of some
of the largest mass defective-product cases consolidated in federal courts over the past
20 years, Reuters found 55 in which judges sealed information concerning public
health and safety. And among those, only three had protective orders containing
language specifically allowing information exchanged by the litigants to be shared
with regulators.”).
52. See Endo, supra note 46, at 1277 (“The Case Set also illustrates courts’
tendency to approve proposed stipulated protective orders. Out of the 100 proposed
orders, only five were denied.”); Ashley A. Kutz, Note, Rethinking the “Good Cause”
Requirement: A New Federal Approach to Granting Protective Orders Under
F.R.C.P. 26(c), 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 291, 303 (2007); see also United Nuclear Corp.,
905 F.2d at 1427 (“[S]tipulated ‘blanket’ protective orders are becoming standard
practice in complex cases.”); but see Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
PROTECTIVE ORDER ACTIVITY IN THREE FEDERAL JUDICIAL DISTRICTS: REPORT TO
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 4–5 (1996); Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy
by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 302 (1999) (reasoning that the Wiggins study “does not
support claims that federal district courts have perfunctorily acceded to a plethora of
stipulated requests for discovery protective orders . . .”).
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standing orders, many agreements involve umbrella provisions that
conceal anything designated by a party.53 The parties often agree to
protective orders supported by thin or non-existent proof of good cause.
Courts enter them because the parties have agreed. Courts have enough
disputes to resolve without routinely questioning agreed matters.
The General Motors (“GM”) ignition litigation is a stark example of
the impact of protective orders. General Motors manufactured cars with
ignitions that sometimes inadvertently slipped into a mode that
simultaneously limited maneuverability and disabled the airbags.54 Over
100 people died as a result, and many more were injured.55 Sadly, GM
knew of the defect for years, but failed to timely recall the vehicles or
adequately disclose the issue to regulators.56 All the while, litigation
involving the ignition defect continued in courts around the country.
Eventually, after litigation uncovered damning documents showing
GM knew of the problem and did not take relatively inexpensive measures
to remedy it, the company conducted an investigation and recalled
hundreds of thousands of vehicles.57 Still, broad protective orders
concealed information – from the public and regulators – relevant to the
ignition problem.
In 2014, a lawyer representing the parents of a twenty-nine-year-old
ignition-related crash victim revealed some of the information to
regulators, despite being bound by a protective order.58 Shortly after, GM
expanded the recall by millions of vehicles, and multiple investigations
ensued. GM ultimately entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and
paid $900 million to resolve criminal charges.59
But the GM ignition scandal was far from the first case in which
protective orders were used to conceal widespread harm and risk from the
public. In the Ford/Firestone affair, a combination of defective tires and
53. See, e.g., Endo, supra note 465 at 1276–77 (“all of the orders [in the
researcher’s case set] provide umbrella protections, permitting the parties to designate
material ‘confidential’ and shield it from general disclosure.”).
54. Bill Vlasic, G.M.’s Ignition Switch Death Toll Hits 100, N.Y. TIMES, (May
11,
2015)_https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/gms-ignition-switchdeath-toll-hits100.html#:~:text=But%20while%20the%20Ford%2DFirestone,million%20affected
%20cars%20last%20year [https://perma.cc/6XB6-RLH7].
55. See id.
56. See Spector, Dowdell, & Lesser, supra note 26 (“A 2015 deferred prosecution
agreement between GM and federal prosecutors showed the company scrambled for
years to make sense of mounting reports of deaths and injuries while keeping
regulators and the public in the dark about the switches, even after uncovering clear
internal evidence they were defective.”); Vlasic, supra note 54 (“[T]he defect was
essentially hidden for a decade until G.M. began recalling 2.6 million affected cars.”).
57. Vlasic, supra note 54; see also Spector, Dowdell, & Lesser, supra note 26.
58. See Spector, Dowdell, & Lesser, supra note 26.
59. See id.
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unstable SUVs created a dangerous rollover risk that killed or injured
hundreds of victims.60 The first cases settled in the early 1990s while
protective orders kept pertinent information out of the hands of the public
and regulators. Then, almost a decade later, the media published
information leaked from litigation.61 A recall and investigations ensued,
but in the meantime, people died in rollovers.62
Protective orders are not limited to the defective-vehicle context. In
a particularly painful example of litigation-confidentiality harms, priests
sexually abused children while litigation involving the abuse of other
children was hidden by court order.63 In 2013, after initial resistance, the
Catholic church agreed to release documents that had been subject to a
protective order.64 The information, involving the Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, documented decades of sexual abuse of children and the
actions of an archbishop who moved church money to avoid paying sexual
assault victims’ claims.65
Protective orders are typically applicable to unfiled discovery. As
the examples supra show, this information – filed or not – can concern
issues of grave importance that have significant public safety implications.
But it is often exchanged between the parties and their attorneys through
physical (or now, more commonly, electronic) exchange. Much discovery
never makes its way into court files, and as a result the process gives courts
a degree of distance from the unseemly business of warehousing secret
information that could save lives.66 Instead of residing in the courthouse,

60. See, e.g., Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 822 n.23; see also generally ADAM L.
PENENBERG, TRAGIC INDIFFERENCE: ONE MAN’S BATTLE WITH THE AUTO INDUSTRY
OVER THE DANGERS OF SUVS (2003).
61. Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 822 n.23 (“Bridgestone and Firestone employed
judge-enforced confidentiality orders in cases across America to hide information
about injuries and deaths linked with the tread separation of their tires. As a result, for
nearly a decade, the public and government agencies had little inkling of the issue and
consumers continued to buy the potentially deadly tires.”); see, e.g., Keith Bradsher,
Documents Show Firestone Knew of Rising Warranty Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/08/business/documents-show-firestoneknew-of-rising-warranty-costs.html [https://perma.cc/KZ4U-DEZ9].
62. See Lesser, et al., supra note 2.
63. See, e.g., Moskowitz, supra note 6, at 822; see also Johnson & Gabler, supra
note 6.
64. See Johnson & Gabler, supra note 6.
65. See id.
66. A few decades ago, there was a dispute about whether discovery materials
were subject to a broad presumption of access because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
5, at that time, required the materials to be filed. The dispute was resolved, in favor of
a more confidential discovery process, when Rule 5 was amended to forbid the filing
of most discovery. See Mary Elizabeth Keaney, Note, Don’t Steal My Sunshine:
Deconstructing the Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled Documents
Exchanged During Discovery, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 795, 810–11 (2011).
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much of this information remains in lawyers’ offices and on lawyers’
servers.
Nevertheless, as cases march forward, some discovery
information does make its way into court files via motion practice.67

2. Ubiquitous Protective Orders Lead to Pervasive Sealing
Protective orders often make sealed filings the default. The orders,
supported by good cause alone, cannot keep discovery confidential once
filed. So, they sometimes require filing all protected information under
seal or forbid filing protected material without first seeking a sealing order
for the material.68 Though courts could technically reject the sealing
request, it will likely be unopposed and routinely granted.69
In this way, protective orders create a ball-down-the-hill effect at the
next, arguably more pernicious, stage in litigation confidentiality.
Information in public court files has historically been just that – public.70
But inertia from the first order – granted on the relatively undemanding
“good-cause” standard – is easy to see. The court granted the order in the
first place, deeming material confidential. Based on that confidential
status, the confidential materials must be filed under seal or not be filed at
all. The materials for which a party seeks sealing have already been
marked as “confidential” under the court-ordered scheme. In many
instances, no party has challenged the designation. Moreover, court
filings, particularly those directly on the merits of the case, may contain
damning information.71 The stakes of allowing public disclosure of this
material can be quite high. And the court’s protective order has already
kept it from public view, making the court complicit to some degree in the
interim secrecy and public harms that may have resulted. It is easy to see
why a court that signed a protective order would not want to eviscerate
protection for the very materials the order had kept confidential.72
67. Cf., e.g., Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing broad
sealing of motions and exhibits) in case involving allegations of sexual assault).
68. See N.D. Cal. Model Stipulated Protective Order, at section 12.3; cf. also
N.D. Cal. Local Rule 79-5, cmt. (“Proposed protective orders, in which parties
establish a procedure for designating and exchanging confidential information, must
incorporate the procedures set forth in this rule if, in the course of proceedings in the
case, a party proposes to submit sealable information to the Judge.”).
69. Cf. Lesser et al., supra note 2 (recounting that the judge in an early civil case
examining opioid manufacturer’s conduct “was bound by West Virginia law to weigh
secrecy against transparency and provide in the court record his reasoning. Like many
judges in his position, he did neither. ‘This case was sealed because both sides agreed
and asked me to seal it’” the judge reportedly told Reuters.).
70. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
71. See, e.g., Lesser et al., supra note 2 (describing inculpatory materials sealed
in opioid litigation).
72. See Endo, supra note 46 (describing courts acceding to party protective-order
stipulations in 95 out of 100 cases in researcher case set).
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Meanwhile, the parties have been habituated to the confidentiality
regime – in both the particular case and in the system at large. In exchange
for easier discovery, one or both of the parties has often agreed to a
protective order.
Information was turned over and designated
“confidential.” For a variety of reasons, the party receiving the
information often has little incentive to challenge the confidentiality
designations. When it comes time to file protected documents, parties
comply with an order requiring they be filed under seal, filed with a
request for sealing, or directing they not be filed at all.73 At this stage in
the litigation – when the focus has shifted to the underlying merits – the
attorneys may simply view protected materials as legitimately confidential
or simply overlook the harder road of contesting presumptive sealing.
Moreover, common protective-order practices infect sealing practice.
Sealing court records is usually a decision reserved to the court. But some
courts have entered sealing orders that apparently delegate court-record
sealing power to litigants, mirroring umbrella protective-order practices.74
A recent example involved the Jeffrey Epstein matter. Epstein, along
with several associates, was accused of sexual impropriety with multiple
alleged victims.75 His associates strongly denied wrongdoing, and one of
the accusers sued one of the alleged wrongdoers for defamation.
Discovery ensued. “Due to the volume of sealing requests filed during
discovery . . . the District Court entered a Sealing Order that effectively
ceded control of the sealing process to the parties themselves.”76 Indeed,
the “Sealing Order disposed of the requirement that the parties file
individual letter briefs to request sealing and prospectively granted all of
the parties future sealing requests.”77
Following the sealing order, the parties filed many motions under
seal, including a motion for summary judgment, responses, and related
exhibits. The district court denied summary judgment in a seventy-sixpage opinion. The opinion itself was heavily redacted to keep secret the
information the parties had decided to seal. The Second Circuit ultimately,
and rightly, rejected the district court’s approach for reasons discussed in
Section III.D, infra.78
73. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 925 (6th Cir.
2019) (“Protective Order also authorized the parties to file pleadings, motions, or other
documents with the court that would be redacted or sealed to the extent they
contained” protected information); see also N.D. Cal. Model Stipulated Protective
Order, at section 12.3.
74. See, e.g., Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46–51 (2d Cir. 2019) (reversing
district court’s refusal to unseal materials where original order delegated sealing
decisions to parties without further court involvement).
75. See id. at 45–46.
76. See id. at 46.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 46–51.
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Excessive sealing has also infected national multi-district litigation
(“MDL”), comprising thousands of cases. For example, in the national
opioid litigation, over 1300 public entities sued drug manufacturers and
distributors for billions in costs related to the opioid crisis.79 According to
the plaintiffs, consumers were prescribed opioids at dangerous levels,
leading to serious injury and death. The over-prescription problem flowed
from, among other reasons, misleading marketing about dosage timing.80
Indeed, documents tending to establish the opioids were mis-marketed
were produced in factually related West Virginia litigation as early as
2004, filed in court, but sealed from public view.81 In the intervening
years, thousands have died from prescription opioids.82
In the opioid MDL, the court allowed defendants to file pleadings and
motions pertaining to the drug’s dangers under seal.83 Ultimately, the
court of appeals reversed the district court’s refusal to lift the seal for
media intervenors and remanded for further consideration.84 In the
meantime, more deaths undoubtedly occurred while documents exposing
the source and nature of the public health danger remained hidden.85
This episode highlights a growing problem. MDLs consolidate
litigation comprising thousands of individual cases. And sealing orders
restrict access to court records in many, if not all, of them. This trend is
particularly troubling when considering the growth of MDL to resolve
national drug and products cases. By one estimate, more than fifty percent
of the entire federal civil docket is now resolved through MDL.86 Thus,
one judge often has the power to secret away a court file that touches major
national issues impacting public health and safety.
One longstanding argument against court-transparency reform is that,
empirically, there is no problem to reform.87 A recent Reuters
investigation seems to provide substantial evidence to the contrary. In a
seminal explication of the there-is-no-problem position, Professor Arthur
Miller queried, “Is it true that protective orders and court seals keep
information regarding public health and safety hidden?”88 Answering his
own question, Professor Miller wrote, “Thus far, assertions to that effect
have been supported primarily by anecdotal evidence; research or

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 2019).
See Lesser, et al., supra note 2.
See id.
Id.
See In re Nat. Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 939.
See id. 939–40.
See Lesser, et al., supra note 2.
See U.S. J.P.M.L., supra note 4; Wittenberg, supra note 4.
Cf., e.g., Miller, supra note 22, at 479–80; Marcus, supra note 1, at 469–70.
Miller, supra note 22, at 480.
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statistical data is completely nonexistent.”89 As Professor Miller
apparently acknowledged in an interview last year, the Reuters analysis
“helps fill that void.”90
The Reuters bombshell investigation examined the implications of
MDL sealing rulings.91 It found that “judges sealed evidence relevant to
public health and safety in about half of the 115 biggest defective-product”
MDLs.92 Indeed, in thirty-one of the 115 cases, judges sealed entire
arguments that addressed the merits of cases. In eighty-five percent of the
MDL cases where judges sealed health and safety information, judges
provided no explanation for the sealing.93 Astonishingly, in thirty-one of
the cases Reuters analyzed, entire motions were filed under seal.94 This
included sealed complaints, summary judgment motions, Daubert
motions, class certification motions, and motions in limine.95
In many instances, those types of filings may be the only place where
the nature and strength of evidence supporting allegations of danger are
aired. Take, for instance, summary judgment motions. If a sealed
summary judgment is granted, the claims resolved are not tried. Assuming
no one is interested or successful in challenging the sealing order,
significant evidence of public danger may not come to light. Imagine the
inverse – the motion for summary judgment is denied and the case is
headed to trial. At trial, for both practical and legal reasons, it becomes
much more difficult to keep evidence from public view.
This reality increases pressure on defendants inclined toward secrecy
to settle cases after losing dispositive motions.96 And it gives the plaintiff
increased leverage to demand money in exchange for a confidential
settlement because the risk of public disclosure increases at the trial
stage.97 Of course, there are other reasons to pay to avoid trial (e.g.,
89. Id.
90. Lesser et al., supra note 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Reuters Staff, Reuters Analysis of U.S. Court Secrecy: The Methodology,
(June 25, 2019 9:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courts-secrecyabout/reuters-analysis-of-u-s-court-secrecy-the-methodology-idUSKCN1TQ1NM
[https://perma.cc/EVH5-MRK6].
94. Id.
95. Id. An analysis of 90 million court actions, using machine learning, also
discovered that 65 percent of products-liability actions involved sealing, though the
information was too vague, etc. to allow analysis of whether public health and safety
information was involved. Id.
96. Cf., e.g., Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of
Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 878–80 (2007) (describing
confidentiality incentives in litigation and settlement); Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.16, 22.5 (9th ed. 2014) (recognizing the possibility that
reputation harm may be traded for money in settlement negotiations).
97. Cf., e.g., see Benham, supra note 7, at 437–41.
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attorney’s fees and the risk of judgment exposure, including the possibility
of a punitive damage award). But the possibility of adverse trial publicity
for information kept confidential through dispositive motion practice puts
pressure on defendants to settle confidentially.

3. Secret Settlements
One of the most potent post-filing tools to keep litigation information
confidential is the settlement agreement. Parties can agree to a wide
variety of terms, including provisions to keep all information learned in
the case confidential in perpetuity, return or destroy case information, or
seek agreed sealing for additional portions of the record.98 Some
agreements may have enforcement teeth in the form of payouts over time
or liquidated damages provisions.99
The settlement agreement itself may have important information with
public danger implications. Theoretically, it is possible for a party to
admit fault directly in a settlement agreement, though it would be rare.
More commonly, both sides deny fault in the terms of the agreement and
recite standard language that they are settling to avoid the uncertainty and
inconvenience of litigation. But even in the absence of a direct admission
of fault, settlement agreements may contain strong circumstantial
evidence of fault.100 This circumstantial evidence could include the
amount paid to settle, terms that require changes in products or practices,
contractually mandated apologies, or even mandatory therapy
requirements for alleged sexual predators.101
This evidence

98. See Laurie Kratky Dore, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South
Carolina’s New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S. C. L. REV. 791,
794, 798 (2004) (discussing the legality of agreements to seal court files, provisions
that require the destruction or return of case information, and overbroad
confidentiality orders); see also Dustin B. Benham, Tangled Incentives:
Proportionality and the Market for Reputation Harm, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 427, 452
(2018) (describing settlement agreements with perpetual protective orders that include
return-or-destroy provisions).
99. See Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information
about Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676 (2001)
(describing safeguards to settlements such as liquidated damages clauses or structured
payment plans that provides the plaintiff with installment payments conditioned upon
further secrecy).
100. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping Point?, 53
VILL. L. REV. 811, 821 (2008) (observing a South Carolina district court’s experience
with court secrecy and a rule regulating sealed settlement agreements).
101. See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 34 (reporting that settlement agreement in
sexual-misconduct dispute “mandated the appointment of three ‘handlers,’ one an
attorney, to respond to sexual-harassment allegations at Miramax. Miramax was
obligated to provide proof that [alleged perpetrator] Weinstein was receiving
counselling for three years or ‘as long as his therapist deems necessary.’”).
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circumstantially, though not necessarily, speaks to the strength of the
claimant’s case and might serve as corroboration for the allegations of
public harm and danger.
But public access to settlement agreements is limited, and many are
kept secret by practical or judicial considerations. In some cases, the
actual settlement agreement is not filed with the court. In most
circumstances, courts dismiss cases upon the agreed request of the
parties.102 The agreement is not filed and only put before the court in the
event of a breach as part of a contract action. When settlement agreements
are filed, at least one analysis suggests that they are not often sealed
(though the amount of settlement is sometimes sealed).103 But a federal
judge, familiar with local rulemaking in the court-confidentiality context,
suggests that docket analysis may not reveal the full extent of the
practice.104

III. LIMITATIONS ON COURT CONFIDENTIALITY
Publicly funded courts routinely bless agreements or issue orders that
keep lifesaving information from the public. What then are the limits on
the parties to contract for secrecy? What are the limits on court power to
order it? This Part examines and proposes reforms to the limitations on
litigation confidentiality in three different contexts: private confidentiality
agreements, protective orders governing unfiled discovery, and sealing
orders governing access to information in court files.

102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
103. See Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement Agreements, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 439 (2006) (“We found that the sealing of settlement
agreements in federal courts is rare, and that typically the only part of the court record
kept secret by the sealing of a settlement agreement is the amount of settlement.”).
104. Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The
Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 738 (2004) (“I
would also contend, however, that the number of sealed settlements is greater than the
index books or docket sheets would suggest. There is no standard procedure for
designating settlements as sealed settlements in the index: Sometimes the index entry
denotes that a settlement has been sealed, but sometimes it merely denotes an order
approving a settlement. It is not until one seeks to retrieve the order, when the file
package is produced from the bowels of the courthouse, that one learns that the
settlement, or some aspect of the file, has been sealed. Even worse, sometimes the
order approving and sealing the settlement does not appear as an entry on the docket
sheet at all.”).
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A. Limitations on Private Confidentiality Agreements
Confidentiality by agreement pervades dispute resolution.105 It is
interwoven into the fabric of litigation. Though putatively “private,” these
agreements rely, in some measure, on the existence of public
court-enforcement power for their efficacy. This Subpart will consider
current limitations on that power and propose reforms to enhance
“sunshine” laws.
Potential limitations on private confidentiality agreements flow from
a few sources, including the First Amendment, state contract law, statute,
court rule, and even federal tax law. “Potential limitations” is the
appropriate phrase because private confidentiality agreements are broadly
enforced, even in cases where they conceal information critical to public
health and safety. This is true even though a few states have attempted to
limit private confidentiality for issues of public importance through
“sunshine” statutes.

1. The First Amendment
If a party breaches a secrecy agreement by revealing confidential
information, the party seeking enforcement may seek damages for breach
or an injunction.106 Both remedies invoke court power, through either a
damages award in an enforceable judgment or an order that a party
breaches at the peril of contempt. Either of these scenarios, most
particularly an injunction against speech, would seem to implicate the First
Amendment.107
Despite the appearance of state action against speech, however,
courts may treat confidentiality agreements as content-neutral, or treat the
agreement as a waiver of First Amendment rights, or some combination of
both.108 At least one scholar, however, has posited that enforcing certain
105. Cf., e.g., Koniak, supra note 7, at 783–88 (considering, e.g., the use of private
agreement in litigation confidentiality).
106. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 16, at 292 (“Aside from seeking damages, a
plaintiff suing for breach of a contract of silence can also seek equitable relief.”).
107. See, e.g., id. at 293 (“If a court enjoins a party from breaching a contract of
silence, it raises constitutional concerns because the injunction is a prior restraint.”);
see generally Abigail Stephens, Contracting Away the First Amendment?: When
Courts Should Intervene in Nondisclosure Agreements, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
541 (2019).
108. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 16, at 358 (“On the one hand, state enforcement
of a contract of silence is arguably legitimate content-neutral regulation of speech.
Private parties, not the state, select the speech being suppressed, so one could call the
regulation content-neutral and thus avoid the strict scrutiny applicable to contentbased regulation of speech. In addition, this content-neutral regulation serves the
indisputably legitimate governmental interest of maintaining the stability of
contractual relations.”).
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confidentiality agreements may be subject to strict scrutiny as contentbased speech regulation.109 This approach would obviously invalidate
many secrecy agreements, but has not found widespread traction in
courts.110

2. Contract Law
Even if the state has the constitutional power to enforce
confidentiality agreements, should it? Courts have long refused to enforce
contracts that violate public policy. The Restatement of Contracts (First)
forbade contracts that concealed crimes.111 The Restatement (Second)
omits that particular provision but refers to the Model Penal Code
provision that forbids “compounding,” a misdemeanor which criminalizes
accepting money to conceal crimes, among other things.112 Most civil
frauds and environmental violations also involve crimes, and agreements
exchanging money to conceal them would, facially at least, be criminal
compounding.113 Mirroring the litigation status quo, the Model Penal
Code, however, provides an affirmative defense exempting agreements
that compensate victims for harm flowing from the criminal conduct.114
The breadth of this defense is less than certain, and if an agreement
provided for compensation beyond the reasonable value of the harm (i.e.,
it compensated not just for the injury but also paid hush money), it might
trigger criminal liability.115

109. See id. (“In summary, if state action exists when a court enforces a contract
of silence, then the state action should be treated as content-based regulation of
speech.”).
110. See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of
Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 362 (1997-1998) (observing the applicability of
strict scrutiny if courts treat enforcement of privacy agreements as content-based
regulation).
111. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (First) § 578 (1932); see also Garfield,
supra note 16, at 310.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981); MODEL PENAL CODE §
242.5 (1980); see also Koniak, supra note 7 at 793–94; see generally John Freeman,
The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55 S.C. L. REV. 829 (2004).
113. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 7, at 793.
114. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5; see also Koniak, supra note 7, at 793–94.
115. Cf. Koniak, supra note 7 at 794–95. With respect to contracts concealing noncriminal conduct that involves public harms, courts might invoke the Restatement’s
general public policy balancing test. Section 178 provides, “A promise or other term
of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides
that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the
circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). Strong public policy
arguments exist against enforcing secrecy agreements that conceal active pedophiles,
deadly environmental hazards, and other public health and safety issues. Cf., e.g.,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6

232

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

3. #MeToo Sunshine
In the wake of several high-profile sex assault scandals, and in
response to the #MeToo movement, several states have moved to limit
confidentiality agreements and orders.116 As described in more detail
supra, wealthy alleged perpetrators used NDAs to silence victims and,
capitalizing on the secrecy, allegedly victimized more women.117 The
statutes place various limitations on NDAs in the sexual harassment
context, with one state (New Jersey) rendering the agreements
unenforceable.118
Some of the laws restrict only confidentiality
agreements in the context of filed lawsuits, leaving the agreements
available pre-suit.119 Other states make the agreements available at the
request of the victim.120 While these statutes are a step forward, the
patchwork approach is sub-optimal. One proponent of the legislation,
acknowledging criticism that the laws did not go far enough, observed that
“we got only half a loaf.”121

4. Traditional Sunshine Legislation
For years, transparency proponents have advocated for “sunshine”
statutes.122 And several states have attempted statutory solutions to court
Garfield, supra note 16, at 332–36 (1998). Nonetheless, courts enforce the
agreements.
116. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-720 (2020); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.11
(West 2020); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2020); 820 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN.
96/1-30 (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109.1 (2020); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-336 (McKinney 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-b (McKinney 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-12.7–12.12 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195 (2020); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.370 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-34-106 (West 2020); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495h (West 2020).
117. See Harris, supra note 43 (highlighting state law efforts to limit secret
settlements in the sexual assault context).
118. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-12.8 (West 2020) (“A provision in any
employment contract or settlement agreement which has the purpose or effect of
concealing the details relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment
(hereinafter referred to as a ‘non-disclosure provision’) shall be deemed against public
policy and unenforceable against a current or former employee (hereinafter referred
to as an ‘employee’) who is a party to the contract or settlement.”).
119. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.11 (West 2020); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1001 (West 2020).
120. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.370(2) (West) (“An employer may enter
into a settlement, separation or severance agreement that includes [a confidentiality
agreement] only when an employee claiming to be aggrieved by [prohibited conduct]
requests to enter into the agreement.”).
121. Zitrin, supra note 44.
122. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 23, at 1565–68; cf. James E. Rooks, Jr.,
Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, 875 (2004).
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secrecy problems.123 For example, Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act,
arguably the broadest such law, forbids private agreements and court
orders that conceal public hazards.124 For decades, a federal Sunshine in
Litigation Act has been introduced but never passed.125 Despite the
admirable efforts of sunshine advocates, the laws in their current form
have largely failed to stem the court secrecy problem.126
The primary reason the laws have failed is that they are not
self-executing and parties are often not incentivized to invoke them.
Likewise, courts are not obligated under most current sunshine statutes to
raise sunshine limitations sua sponte.127 Even if the issue is raised, courts
are reticent to declare that the subject matter of pending litigation is a

123. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2020); TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (West
2020); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.611 (West 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-1020 (2020); see also Benham, supra
note 7, at 452–56 (describing sunshine efforts across the country).
124. The law provides that:
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of
concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or
any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting
themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard, is void,
contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.

§ 69.081(4) (West 2020). The law goes on to define a public hazard as “an
instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person,
procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or
product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury.” § 69.081(2).
125. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. (2017); see
also Jan Wolfe, U.S. House Leader to Back Bill Limiting Court Secrecy,
REUTERS, (Sept. 26, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtssecrecy-congress/u-s-house-leader-to-back-bill-limiting-court-secrecyidUSKBN1WB32P [https://perma.cc/MQ3G-YM6J] (“House Judiciary Committee
Chairman Jerrold Nadler, a Democrat from New York, said he planned to reintroduce
the Sunshine in Litigation Act. The long-debated bill would allow parties in litigation
to share evidence related to public health and safety with state and federal regulators
– even if a judge agreed the evidence should be sealed in court.”); Marcus, supra note
1, at 465; Keaney, supra note 66, at 798 n.7 (noting that the original federal sunshine
bill was considered in 1993).
126. See Benham, supra note 6, at 456–60 (examining common failings of
Sunshine Legislation).
127. See Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 522–25 (Tex. 1998) (holding
that courts are not obligated to raise sunshine issue sua sponte). But courts are free to
raise the statutes sua sponte. See Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, 846 S.W.2d 487, 488
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993) (“The trial judge ruled, however, that
compliance with Rule 76a was necessary before determining whether a protective
order was appropriate.”).
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“public hazard” early in the litigation process.128 Doing so has
implications for the merits of the case, and many courts understandably
want to reserve questions about whether a product, for instance, is
dangerous for the merits stage. Many cases settle before courts get that
opportunity, and the settlement often leaves no one at the table with an
incentive to advocate for sunshine.129 Moreover, the definition of “public
hazard” is amorphous and excludes entire classes of cases that deserve
sunshine (like economic frauds).130
Further, some sunshine statutes (inevitably the product of legislative
“sausage making”) exempt “confidential” commercial information from
their reach.131 This category of information may encompass the dangerous
design of a product or a company process that leads to widespread harm.132
Moreover, some of the statutes only apply to final settlement agreements,
leaving parties free to agree to secrecy in the interim and couple it with a
promise to return-or-destroy any discovery before final settlement ever
occurs.133
Sunshine statutes and rules are a step in the right direction. But the
laws need to be broadened to be effective. I propose some solutions,
including new limitations on private confidentiality agreements, in Section
III.B, infra.

5. Federal Tax Law
One promising new avenue to limit harmful confidentiality arose in
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, passed in 2017.134 In a little-noticed provision,
the law limited tax deductions for sexual harassment settlements made

128. See Ford Motor Co. v. Hall-Edwards, 21 So. 3d 99, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (“The label ‘public hazard’ is not to be affixed to an allegedly-dangerous
product ‘like you would buckle a collar on a bird dog or paste a tag on an express
package that is being forwarded to a friend.’ Attention to a proper evidentiary hearing
and due process are plainly required. Such a label has significant and far-reaching
consequences in a day when court orders can make it around the world before the sun
sets on the day they are filed.” (footnote omitted)).
129. Cf., e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement
Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDIES 111 (2009) (describing
settlement rates across civil case categories).
130. See Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that economic fraud resulting in only financial loss is not a
“public hazard” within the Sunshine in Litigation Act).
131. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (2016).
132. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
133. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(5)(a) (West 2020); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-6-1020(4) (2015); cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a.
134. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
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subject to NDAs.135 Specifically, the law disallowed deductions for “any
settlement or payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such
settlement or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or . . .
attorney’s fees related to such a settlement or payment.”136 One
commentator has noted several issues with the law as written, including
the fact that victims may not be allowed to deduct the attorney’s fees they
paid to obtain the award.137 But sunshine via tax policy, as opposed to
traditional sunshine efforts, is more likely to beget compliance because of
the substantial penalties companies and persons face for noncompliance.138

B. A Proposal for Brighter “Sunshine”
Private agreements to keep information obtained through litigation
confidential should be illegal.139 This does not mean that litigation
information should never be kept confidential – indeed, a wide swath
should be confidential. My proposal is simply that the parties cannot agree
to such confidentiality without involving the court. The court should be
out of the business of rubberstamping explicit or tacit confidentiality
agreements.
Courts and litigation have historically played a significant role in
exposing injustice, corruption, and public hazards.140 It is true that
discovery often takes place in private and without direct court
135. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(q) (2018); see also Shane Rader, Note, The Weinstein
Tax: Congress’ Attempt to Curb Non-Disclosure Agreements in Sexual Harassment
Settlements, 3 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 329, 329 (2019).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 162(q).
137. See Rader, supra note 135, at 334–41. Additionally, by disincentivizing
NDAs in the sexual harassment context, victims may be less likely to obtain an NDA
and privacy protection that some victims desire. And the term “related to sexual
harassment or sexual abuse” is quite vague and might be construed outside of the
context in which the law was intended. Id. at 338–40.
138. But cf. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (2004) (“Congress weaves together civil and criminal penalties to enforce
these [tax-related] duties and leaves the ever unpopular Internal Revenue Service to
swing the net. Like many clichés, however, voluntary self-assessment is true in a more
significant sense than it is false. The tax determination process ultimately rests on
taxpayers disclosing their financial affairs and paying what they owe – through
withholding or otherwise – without overt government compulsion.” (footnotes
omitted)).
139. See Benham, supra note 7, at 463–65; cf. Koniak, supra note 7, at 805
(“[A]greements to keep secret material indicating the existence of a public danger
(whether past, present, or future) should be illegal.”).
140. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 23, at 1579 (“A court, after all, is a publiclyfunded institution; its main function should be to serve the broader interests of the
public.”).
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involvement.141 Indeed, it often takes place in lawyers’ offices and on
private servers, not in the courthouse. But little to no discovery would
ever take place without court power standing behind litigants to enforce
rules that make the process mandatory. Thus, it is with the force of law,
and the imprimatur of courts, that discovery takes place.
Likewise, the taint of scandal that flows from discovery secrecy gone
wrong, especially when it results in serious public harms, stains those very
institutions.142 Moreover, the public funds the court power behind both
the discovery and the adjudicative process. The public deserves to
knowhow that power is being used, whom it shields, and whether
corruption or favor has entered the process.143 The court simultaneously
has the most to lose, should be accountable to the public, and is in the best
position to consider the public interest. The non-court actors in the process
come to resolve a private dispute and, ordinarily, act in their own selfinterest without much regard for countervailing considerations.144
What does it mean to forbid an “agreement” to keep discovery
information confidential? Parties in litigation might agree in several
different ways. First, parties might enter into an explicit oral or written
agreement to keep information confidential. Second, parties might
stipulate to confidentiality in court papers. Third, parties could simply
agree not to oppose a motion for a protective order or some other
confidentiality device. Fourth, parties could putatively oppose a motion
for confidentiality but secretly, or even with a “wink wink,” agree not to
vigorously contest the motion. The proposal I suggest would be primarily
focused on eliminating the first and second forms of agreement and require
141. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 n.19 (1984).
142. Cf., e.g., Zitrin, supra note 23, at 1579 (“At the least, when such information
reveals the danger of a public hazard or threat, the courts have an obligation to the
public they serve to disclose this information, and the danger must trump any claim of
privacy.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and the Social Benefits of Discovery:
Out of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 REV. LITIG. 647, 650–54 (2015).
143. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978);
Zitrin, supra note 23, at 1572 (“Judicial action is often necessary to fulfill the
judiciary’s ethical and moral responsibility to the public. A court that engages in
judicial action to promote the health and safety of the public is serving the public trust
in a manner consistent with the codes of judicial conduct. A court that does not so act
is in danger of harming that public trust.”).
144. Requiring the court to decide which litigation information becomes and
remains confidential also has the collateral benefit of reducing the incentives of some
parties to seek low-merits-value information for the purpose of “selling”
confidentiality back to the producing party. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 7, at 463–
65; see also Koniak, supra note 7, at 797–800 (“[W]e have to ask whether the
willingness of courts to accept, and enforce, litigation-related agreements that
compensate people in part for keeping quiet about information that they would
otherwise be free to speak about . . . transforms litigation into precisely the kind of
institution from which our blackmail laws are designed to save us . . .”).
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all confidentiality issues to come before the court for decision. The law
cannot force parties to vigorously oppose and litigate matters that they
have no incentive to litigate. But by requiring the court’s involvement –
whether or not the parties actively oppose confidentiality – the instances
in which sunshine is appropriately applied to litigation materials will
increase.
The subject-matter scope of this proposal is quite broad in one way –
it includes all litigation information. But the context is, in many senses,
narrow. The restriction on private confidentiality agreements would not
reach agreements outside the litigation context. There may be reasons to
make entire categories of confidentiality agreements illegal as contrary to
public policy, whether they involve litigation information or not, but that
is beyond the scope of my proposal.145
The restriction I describe would simply require courts to decide
whether the fruits of discovery should be kept confidential. To do so,
courts would employ the protective-order powers granted to them by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(c).146 Good cause exists, and
courts would have ample power, to protect, e.g., legitimate trade secrets,
some proprietary and competitive information, many medical records, and
personal identifying information.147 On the other hand, there is not often
good reason to protect the identities of pedophiles, the existence of
environmental contamination, and other public hazards.148
In a world of busy court dockets and judges who detest discovery
fights, what incentive would courts have to assiduously examine requests
for confidentiality? Will not the parties (at least tacitly) agree not to
contest each other’s requests, leaving the system in much the same place
it is now? The answer is to craft a framework that requires, and
documents, judicial involvement irrespective of the wishes of the parties.
145. Professor Scott Moss came to an interesting conclusion: in a system that
makes contracts to conceal litigation information unenforceable, more parties may
settle claims before a lawsuit is filed to avoid the restriction. See Moss, supra note 96,
at 882. Nevertheless, a restriction on contracts for litigation information would give at
least another degree of separation between public courts and harmful court secrecy.
Legislatures should also consider limitations on private, court-enforceable contracts
for secrecy in certain contexts. Cf., e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-12.8 (West 2020)
(rendering confidentiality agreements unenforceable in the sexual harassment and
assault context).
146. These powers may be confined, to some degree, by the First Amendment. See
a full discussion of the issue in infra Section III.C.
147. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (stating that courts may enter an order
to restrict access to confidential commercial information and trade secrets); cf. Pearson
v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 61–62 (3d Cir. 2000) (psychiatric records).
148. See Zitrin, supra note 23, at 1579 (“At the least, when such information
reveals the danger of a public hazard or threat, the courts have an obligation to the
public they serve to disclose this information, and the danger must trump any claim of
privacy.”).
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In this regard, the latest iteration of the yet-to-be-passed federal
Sunshine in Litigation Act has positive features.149 The Act requires
judges to make independent fact findings supporting confidentiality.150
Beyond the independent-findings requirement, judges should be required
to detail their reasoning for granting or denying confidentiality requests.
Moreover, judges should, where appropriate, be required to go beyond the
pleadings in the case to assess the putatively confidential materials at
issue. Confidentiality orders should be written to maximize the exposition
of fact finding and reasoning while minimizing any redactions in the order
itself.151
One big practical question surrounding a no-private-confidentialityagreement system: How do courts go about fact finding to support
umbrella protective orders that delegate confidentiality designations to the
parties? These orders are ubiquitous.152 One can see why courts would
find them desirable – in an era of e-discovery, cases can involve the
exchange of millions of documents. Courts simply do not have the
resources to turn each page of these productions by hand to resolve
confidentiality issues.
But, for reasons discussed infra, these orders (absent a stipulation)
violate Rule 26(c) and the First Amendment. Judges should not despair,
however, because technology (including technology-assisted review) and
other procedures (e.g., party-generated summaries) may alleviate page-bypage burdens on courts without delegating, wholesale, confidentiality
determinations to the parties. The problems with umbrella orders in a
no-private-confidentiality-agreement environment, and potential
solutions, are discussed in Section III.C.3.b, infra.
Another potential problem with outlawing private confidentiality
agreements for information obtained through litigation: What does it mean
to obtain information through litigation?153 It means, at a minimum,
information exchanged in response to a formal discovery request,

149. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. (2017).
150. Id.
151. Cf. Benham, supra note 7, at 462–63.
152. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 23, at 9. (“Against this background, it should
come as no surprise that in complex cases the parties customarily stipulate to
protective orders negotiated by opposing counsel. In recognition of the general
confidentiality of discovery, these negotiations normally focus on which protective
devices the parties will use – e.g., limitations on access, separate storage, and the
designation of persons eligible for access – rather than on the question of whether
there should be an order limiting dissemination of discovery materials. These
stipulated orders, which usually provide ‘umbrella’ protection for all materials
designated confidential by the party producing them, have become the norm in many
areas of federal practice.”); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.432 (4th
ed. 2004).
153. See Benham, supra note 7, at 462.
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including at deposition. Formal discovery in a pending case, even if
conducted outside the four walls of the courthouse, takes place by virtue
of federal or state law subject to the enforcement power of the court.
Information exchanged through this mechanism should be squarely within
a prohibition against private confidentiality agreements.
If the private-confidentiality-agreement prohibition were limited to
formal discovery, however, parties would be incentivized to exchange
information informally, by oral or written agreement. To counter this,
information “obtained” in litigation should be broadly defined, and should
also include the informal exchange, between parties to civil litigation, of
information that is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case.154
Another problem that might arise in a no-private-confidentiality
litigation system could be hidden or shadow agreements. In addition to
keeping litigation information confidential, parties could agree to keep the
existence of the confidentiality agreement confidential. Even if the law
voided such agreements, the parties often have major incentives (as
discussed supra) to pursue broad secrecy, even when it comes at the
expense of the public. Incentives to invoke sunshine laws to void
confidentiality agreements are quite weak in many instances. Thus,
though technically illegal, hidden confidentiality agreements could still be
a potent source of secrecy.
To counter this potential issue, an effective sunshine law should
provide for civil sanctions against anyone who enters into an illegal
agreement.155 The civil sanctions regime could be made quite effective by
requiring certifications during litigation. For instance, Rule 41 allows for
the parties to stipulate to a dismissal, and parties invoke it to end cases
when they settle.156 The rule could be amended to require parties seeking
such a dismissal to certify in writing that they have made no illegal
confidentiality agreements covering information obtained in litigation.157
Even outside the dismissal context, Rule 16 could be amended to require
parties to certify pretrial that they have not entered into any confidentiality
agreements covering litigation information.158
False certifications would violate multiple procedural rules and be
subject to the sanctions power of the court. The sanctions imposed for
violations would contemplate the circumstances but should target culpable
actors and be at a level sufficient to discourage illegal confidentiality.
154. See id.
155. See Koniak, supra note 7, at, 805. (“Merely rendering [confidentiality
agreements for illegitimate secrets] unenforceable in court is simply not enough.”);
see also Benham, supra note 7, at 463.
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
157. Cf. Moss, supra note 96, at 882–83 (“[A]ll that is necessary to ban
confidentiality [of settlements] is for Rule 41 to state that the court-filed dismissal
stipulation must attach a copy of the parties’ settlement agreement.”).
158. See Benham, supra note 7, at, 463.
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Moreover, an attorney who made a false certification would be subject to
professional discipline. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, among
others, forbids lawyers from “mak[ing] a false statement of fact” to a
court.159
All of this raises bigger fundamental questions: If the parties are
incentivized to secrecy and the public has no right of access to unfiled
discovery, will not the information remain secret even if no order requires
it be kept secret? And does not this reality cut against the point of sunshine
in the first place – protecting the public? My response to this concern is
two-fold. First, it is not that the parties have no incentives to make
litigation information public. In fact, many people desire to prevent the
harm that has befallen them from hurting someone else. But where
confidentiality agreements are available, the parties often are incentivized
to trade money for secrecy. When that bargain becomes illegal, the desire
to protect the public through disclosure may yet win out. Second,
protecting the public is not the only point of sunshine legislation. Another
purpose is extracting the court from the illicit market in harmful
confidential information.
Beyond disincentivizing judges, parties, and attorneys from engaging
in, or ratifying, illegal confidentiality arrangements, an effective sunshine
law would also properly incentivize third parties who act on behalf of the
public interest.160 Media intervenors and public interest groups are often
in the best position to expose wrongdoing to the broader public.161 But, as
discussed supra, resource constraints and incentives often deter them from
intervening.162
At the outset, a proper sunshine law needs to account for the problem
of “unknown unknowns.” Information asymmetry is a strong practical
limitation working against third-party intervention – the organizations that
would intervene simply do not know the nature of the materials kept secret
and thus are not properly incentivized to uncover it. Some state sunshine
laws already require public posting of sealing orders.163 But in the
intervening decades, technology has made a central repository of
information about protective orders and sealing orders feasible. New
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also
Zitrin, supra note 23, at 1602 (proposing ethical rule to limit attorney participation in
confidentiality agreements).
160. See Benham, supra note 7, at 466–67.
161. See, e.g., Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2019) (media
intervened to obtain access to, and later publish, information related to alleged sexual
assaults).
162. See supra Section II.A.
163. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (“Court records may be sealed only upon a party’s
written motion, which shall be open to public inspection. The movant shall post a
public notice at the place where notices for meetings of county governmental bodies
are required to be posted . . . .”).
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sunshine laws should create such a repository for the respective court
system in which they apply. The repository would aggregate basic case
and order information and make it publicly accessible at no charge.
Additionally, by court and jurisdiction, the courts should publish
comprehensive statistics regarding protective and sealing orders.
More information would be a first step, but intervenors still face other
resource constraints. Accordingly, a proper sunshine law should provide
for intervenor attorney fees and costs in successful interventions, at least
where parties resist the intervention to maintain confidentiality.164 This
would disincentivize meritless party opposition to transparency. On the
other side of the balance, the threat of an attorney’s fee award against an
intervenor would be a substantial deterrent to intervention, so the law
should limit or eliminate awards against good faith intervenors. Meritless
interventions would still be disincentivized by laws and rules prohibiting
frivolous filings. But intervenors would not be chilled by the risk of an
adverse attorney’s fee award in close cases.
Banning private confidentiality for litigation materials would make
the system more transparent and extricate courts from illicit confidentiality
bargains. Doing so recognizes the lack of party incentives to contest
confidentiality. Indeed, effective sunshine laws should take an approach
that recognizes the power of party incentives to agree to secrecy, the taint
that flows to courts from these agreements, and the public harm that flows
from them.165

C. A “New” Limitation on Court-Issued Protective Orders
The primary limitation on confidentiality orders for unfiled discovery
is Rule 26(c), and coupled with stipulations and courts seeking streamlined
discovery, it has not been much of a limitation. At least part of the trend
toward broad secrecy surrounding unfiled discovery is rooted in courts’
discretion in fashioning protective orders. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has characterized this rule-based discretion as “broad.”166
Protective orders, however, are court orders that silence people. Indeed,
they bear a striking resemblance to classic prior restraints, subject to strict

164. See Benham, supra note 7, at 466–67.
165. A yet-to-be-seen impact of such a system might be on the scope of discovery.
If courts and parties have less access to secrecy by agreement, might courts quietly
use Rule 26 discretion to reduce access to information? Possibly. But decisions
limiting discovery are subject to higher-court and public scrutiny. To the extent a trial
court abuses its discretion in the area, it will be subject to reversal and be available for
all to see.
166. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6

242

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

scrutiny. Nevertheless, some courts have read the First Amendment out
of the protective-order framework entirely.167
I contend, as I have elsewhere, that a First-Amendment-less approach
ignores critical language in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, the Court’s seminal
protective-order case.168 Rather than holding that the First Amendment
did not apply to Rule 26(c) protective orders, the court held – at a
minimum – that “where, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a
showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c) . . . it does not offend the
First Amendment.”169 I have gone further, in previous work, and
contended that the best reading of Seattle Times, in light of the Court’s
subsequent statements regarding the case, invites lower courts to apply
intermediate scrutiny to individual protective orders.170
For the sake of discussion, let us table the question of whether
intermediate scrutiny applies and instead focus on a narrower reading of
Seattle Times: A protective order unsupported by good cause violates the
First Amendment. What are the likely implications of this reading?
Before we turn to this question, it would be good to briefly examine the
history of the First Amendment and protective orders.

1. The History of the First Amendment and Protective Orders
As pretrial litigation and discovery continued to evolve after the
adoption of the civil rules, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the First Amendment did not apply to pretrial
protective orders.171 This approach prevailed for a decade or so. Then, in
a decision that sent shockwaves through the litigation world, the D.C.
Circuit applied the First Amendment to invalidate a protective order.172 In
In re Halkin, the court examined an order in a case where the government
was alleged to have wrongfully monitored anti-war activists who opposed
the Vietnam war.173 The court applied strict scrutiny and struck it down.
A few years later, the First Circuit examined a protective order in a case
involving allegations of politically motivated assassinations carried out by
the police.174 The court applied a modified version of strict scrutiny to
uphold the order, in part, on First Amendment grounds.175 Commentators
167. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“Seattle Times prohibits a court considering a protective order from concerning itself
with first amendment considerations.”).
168. See generally Benham, supra note 6, at 1781.
169. Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 37.
170. See Benham, supra note 6, at 1811–16.
171. See Int’l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407–08 (2d Cir. 1963).
172. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
173. See id. at 179–80.
174. See In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981).
175. See id. at 116.
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criticized the decisions as imperiling the discovery process, and the
Supreme Court soon had a chance to weigh in with Seattle Times.176
The case involved unique facts and competing First Amendment
considerations.177 Keith Rhinehart led a religious sect called the Aquarian
Foundation.178 Over the course of years, the Seattle Times and Walla
Walla Union-Bulletin published several articles exposing unflattering
details about the foundation and Rhinehart. According to the papers,
Rhinehart led seances, supposedly communicated with the dead, expelled
stones from his body, consorted with Incredible Hulk star Lou Ferrigno,
and held concerts at a prison where his female followers allegedly danced
nude.179
Upset with the coverage, Rhinehart filed a libel suit in Washington
state court. Discovery ensued, and the newspapers sought information
about the foundation’s membership and donors.180
According to Rhinehart, the newspapers had stated their intention to
use discovery information in upcoming articles.181 After some pretrial
wrangling, the trial court granted a protective order with respect to
member and donor information. The order forbade “publishing,
disseminating, or using the information in any way except where necessary
to prepare for and try the case.”182
Seattle Times presented a collision of First Amendment interests.
The case involved a media defendant in a defamation action, with status
of the “press,” pitted against a religious organization with interests in
freely exercising its faith. The information at issue pertained to
individuals’ associations with one another in a religious context, and to the
financial affairs of a religious entity. The order at issue, in virtually every
respect, appeared to be a prior restraint limiting the dissemination of
specific content under the threat of contempt. All of this took place after
a court compelled production of the sensitive information in the first place.
Ultimately, Justice Powell, writing for the court, observed that
the crucial question that this case presents is whether a litigant’s
freedom [of speech] comprehends the right to disseminate information
that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that both granted him
176. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 2 (contending that protective-order regime was
“threatened by a series of decisions based on an amalgam of common law and first
amendment principles that require litigation of protective order issues and deprive
protective orders, particularly those entered by stipulations, of their reliability”);
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 22 (1984).
177. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 22–23.
178. See id. at 22.
179. See id. at 22–23.
180. See id. at 24.
181. See id. at 25.
182. Id. at 27.
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access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which
the information might be used.183

Critically, Justice Powell also wrote that “[i]t is, of course, clear that
information obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern rules
of civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of
unprotected speech identified by decisions of this court.”184
The court thus recognized that protective orders restrict speech about
discovery information but also that discovery was a special context. A
look at the case and related materials also suggests that the approach was
the product of compromise to hold a unanimous, though ideologically
fractured, court together for largely pragmatic reasons. A few things are
clear from Justice Powell’s majority, and a few things are left muddled. It
is clear that the First Amendment played some role in the Court’s analysis
– the opinion says as much and even cited the intermediate scrutiny test in
evaluating the lower court’s actions.185 On the other hand, it is equally
clear that the First Amendment does not provide a right of access to
discovery materials for litigants.
To understand Seattle Times, it is important to distinguish between
the right to access discovery materials and a person’s right to disseminate
materials obtained through the “legislative grace” of the discovery rules.186
The Court had previously recognized the public’s First Amendment right
to access “court records.”187 But in Seattle Times, it noted that “[a] litigant
has no First Amendment right of access to information made available
only for purposes of trying his suit.”188 This does not mean – contrary to
some readings of the case – that the First Amendment provides no
protection for dissemination of those same materials once a litigant obtains
them through discovery.189
Several other questions remain muddled, including the level of First
Amendment scrutiny for protective orders and whether that scrutiny is
paid to the practice of issuing protective orders generally or to individual
protective orders. At least one plausible explanation for this muddling was
Justice Powell’s desire to hold together a unanimous court and prevent a
deeper split in the case with Justice Brennan and the court’s left wing.
On one end of the spectrum, several justices appeared to be quite
concerned with the notion of federalizing state court protective-order

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 31.
See id. at 32–33.
See id. at 32.
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 32.
Cf., e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/6

34

Benham: Foundational and Contemporary Court Confidentiality

2021] ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS ON COURT CONFIDENTIALITY

245

disputes.190 The reasoning apparently went that, if discovery and
protective orders were subject to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
would be the court of last resort for discovery disputes.191 On the other
end of the spectrum, Justices Brennan and Marshall were adamant, as
evidenced in a concurrence authored by Brennan, that individual
protective orders were speech restraints and subject to intermediate
scrutiny.192
Perhaps splitting the difference, Justice Powell wrote an ambiguous
opinion. This ambiguity led to a split among courts. Some courts appear
to have concluded that the First Amendment plays no role in the
protective-order analysis.193 At the other end of the spectrum, at least one
court has applied intermediate scrutiny to a protective order.194 In the
middle, courts have observed the First Amendment plays some lesser role
in the analysis or have incorporated First Amendment considerations into
the good-cause analysis.195
All of these readings ignore a profound implication of Seattle Times:
A protective order that is not supported by good cause violates the First
Amendment. This conclusion flows from the reasonable of two possible
interpretations of the case. First, an implausible interpretation: Good
cause exceeds the level of protection afforded by the First Amendment, so
a protective order supported by good cause also satisfies the First
Amendment. This reading is implausible, however, because it implies that
the First Amendment can be satisfied by a showing so minimal that it
cannot be characterized as good cause. Surely, the First Amendment
provides more protection than this, particularly in cases restraining the
190. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20 (1984) (No. 82-1721).
191. See, e.g., id. at 23–24.
192. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 37–38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
193. See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1119.
194. See In re Requests for Investigation of Attorney E., 78 P.3d 300, 310 (Colo.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (applying Procunier intermediate scrutiny
test to issuance of an individual protective order).
195. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (reading
Seattle Times to apply “heightened” scrutiny to the practice of issuing protective
orders but allowing for a more flexible inquiry with respect to particular protective
orders). Supreme Court decisions citing Seattle Times tend to support First
Amendment protection for discovery dissemination. The Court has never explicitly
revisited Seattle Times, but it has described and characterized its holding. In Sorrell v.
IMS Health, Inc., the court examined a state statute that restricted the dissemination
of prescriber information that pharmacies collected. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). The Court noted that “In Seattle Times, this Court applied
heightened judicial scrutiny before sustaining a trial court order prohibiting a
newspaper’s disclosure of information it learned through coercive discovery.” Id. at
568. This reading of Seattle Times suggests that greater scrutiny than good cause
might apply to courts’ issuance of protective orders.
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dissemination of content central to governance or relating to public safety.
If not, it is hard to say that the Constitution plays any role in the analysis,
and Justice Powell was quite direct in noting that the First Amendment
plays some role, albeit reduced.
A more plausible reading of Seattle Times: Protective orders satisfy
the First Amendment if, and only if, they are supported by good cause.196
This reading also makes the inverse true – a protective order unsupported
by good cause violates the First Amendment. This reading accounts for
the “lesser” protection for discovery dissemination that Justice Powell
announced earlier in the opinion.197 But it also recognizes, as Justice
Powell implied and as Justice Brennan stressed in concurrence, that the
First Amendment applies to the issuance of individual protective orders,
as opposed to the general practice of protective orders.198

2. Implications of Constitutionalizing “Good Cause”
This reading has several possible implications. First, it has some
impact on the balance of power between state and federal courts in the
secrecy context. Second, a “constitutionalized form of good cause” limits
the degree of control legislatures and the courts exercise over the “goodcause” definition. Third, an expanded First Amendment may impact the
standard of review for protective orders. And fourth, the reading indicates
that the “good-cause” analysis should contemplate traditional First
Amendment values.199
a. Federal v. State Power

If protective orders indeed raise a First Amendment issue, they are
subject to the supervisory power of the federal courts. This is true of both
federal and state court orders.200 Does that make the Supreme Court the

196. As mentioned previously, I have contended elsewhere that the best reading
of Seattle Times requires courts to apply intermediate scrutiny to individual protective
orders in most contexts. See Benham, supra note 6, at 1811–16.
197. Cf. Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34.
198. Cf. id. at 37–38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. Cf. Benham, supra note 6, at 1818–22 (considering the impact of applying
the First Amendment to protective orders).
200. At oral argument, Justice Stevens raised the point. He inquired, “isn’t it a
virtual certainty that we are going to have a federal question in every case” in which
a court issues a protective order? Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (No. 82-1721). After counsel for Seattle Times
answered “yes,” Justice Stevens continued, “That we’re going to have to we’re [sic]
the last court of resort for discovery all over the country . . .?” and “So every good
cause for a protective order raises a First Amendment issue[?]” Id. at 24.
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court of last resort for all the nation’s discovery fights?201 The answer is
no. First of all, Seattle Times clearly held that litigants have no First
Amendment right of access to discovery materials.202 Discovery rules are
a matter of “legislative grace” and, as such, a party’s entitlement to
discovery does not raise a First Amendment concern.203 Thus, state court
discovery disputes over the appropriateness of particular discovery remain
in state courts. Second, the Court already supervises a vast federal
discovery system and rarely wades into routine discovery disputes.
Certiorari is a discretionary power. Third, comity and federalism concerns
may limit the Court’s willingness to wade into ongoing state court
proceedings. Indeed, the Court has demonstrated its willingness to allow
state court protective orders to stand. It denied review of a 2003 Colorado
Supreme Court decision citing Seattle Times and applying intermediate
scrutiny to a protective order.204
b. Legislative Power

Additionally, a constitutional version of good cause would limit the
power of legislatures to increase court secrecy. Imagine, hypothetically,
that Congress prescribed an automatic protective order in every case.205
By doing so, Congress would effectively abrogate the requirement that a
party show good cause to obtain such an order. These orders, entered on
no evidentiary showing, would violate the First Amendment. Indeed,
Congress’s attempt to eliminate good cause would itself be
unconstitutional. With no showing required, these orders likely violate the
First Amendment.
c. Appellate Review

Treating the issuance of protective orders as a constitutional question
also has implications for appellate review.206 In particular, the standard of
review for good-cause determinations is typically abuse of discretion.207
201. See id.
202. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 32 (“A litigant has no First Amendment
right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.”).
203. See id.
204. See In re Requests for Investigation of Attorney E., 78 P.3d 300, 310 (Colo.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
205. Cf. Endo, supra note 46, at 1299 (observing that “some systems – like
Canada’s – treat unfiled discovery as presumptively confidential and prohibit its use
beyond the confines of the instant case.”).
206. See Benham, supra note 6, at, 1818.
207. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428
(10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in making
protective order ruling).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6

248

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

If protective orders are reviewed for constitutional infirmity, this standard
of review is too deferential. Both the application of First Amendment
principles, along with fact-finding in the First Amendment context,
deserves less deference.208 For example, courts engaged in the good-cause
inquiry examine whether, among other factors, the information to be kept
confidential is of public interest or concern, as discussed infra.
Determining whether information is of public concern is not an inquiry of
historical fact, shielded by a deferential review standard. Rather, the
determination would define the contours of the First Amendment itself.
Accordingly, appellate courts should pay less deference to “fact”-finding
in the area.209
d. First Amendment Considerations and Rule 26(c)

Good cause is, and should, be imbued with First Amendment
considerations. Courts across the country have utilized some version of
the Pansy (or Glenmede) factors to evaluate whether there is good cause
to issue (or sustain an existing) protective order:
(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;
(2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or
for an improper purpose;
(3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party
embarrassment;
(4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important
to public health and safety;
(5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote
fairness and efficiency;
(6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a
public entity or official; and

208. Compare Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505–
11 (1984) (appellate courts exercise independent judgment in First Amendment
cases), with United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th
Cir. 1990) (district court did not abuse its discretion in making protective order ruling);
see also Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229,
229–30 (1985); cf., e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (observing
the clarifying power of de novo review of constitutional questions); but cf. Martin H.
Redish & William D. Gohl, The Wandering Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 59 ARIZ.
L. REV. 289, 291, 307 (2017).
209. Cf. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 505–11.
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(7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.210

Moreover, good cause requires a party to establish a substantial
interest in confidentiality.211 Indeed, the party must establish, through
particularized evidence, substantial or serious harm in the absence of
confidentiality.212 Any protective order should be no broader than
necessary to protect the asserted interest in confidentiality. Thus, free
speech concerns already permeate the Rule 26(c) analysis, as they should.

3. Impact of a Constitutional Reading of “Good Cause” on Common
Discovery Practices
What are the implications for common protective-order practices,
like discovery sharing and umbrella orders? Discovery-sharing provisions
should be required by application of ordinary Rule 26(c) principles and
would, likewise, be required by the First Amendment.213 With respect to
umbrella orders, I have suggested that the practice survives, in large
measure, by stipulation of the parties.214 In later work I have suggested,
as I do here, that stipulated, or agreed, confidentiality should be illegal for
information obtained in litigation.215 This raises a question: Are umbrella
orders permissible under either Rule 26(c) or the First Amendment without
party agreement? The answer is no, for reasons explained infra.
a. Discovery Sharing

Discovery sharing between similar cases is a practice protected by
the good-cause standard and largely embraced by courts.216 Courts are in
conflict, however, concerning the timing and procedure by which to share
discovery.217 Two primary mechanisms enable litigants to share: “upfront
sharing” protective orders and intervention-and-modification practice.
Upfront sharing provisions define a sharing scope that allows litigants to
share information within the scope without further court intervention.218
Imagine, for instance, that a person is injured by a defective automobile,
210. Harmon v. City of Santa Clara, 323 F.R.D. 617, 623 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing
Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (making body camera
footage public in excessive force case)).
211. See, e.g., Allen v. City of N.Y., 420 F. Supp. 2d 295, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
212. See, e.g., Glenmede Tr. Co., 56 F.3d at 483; Allen, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
213. See generally Benham, supra note 8, at 2226–27.
214. See Benham, supra note 6, at 1826–27.
215. See Benham, supra note 7, at, 463–64.
216. See generally Benham, supra note 8, at 2191.
217. See id. at 2202–13 (describing two different court approaches to discovery
sharing).
218. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 346–47 (Tex. 1987).
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sues, and seeks discovery about the allegedly defective product. An
upfront sharing provision might provide that the person and her attorneys
can share information with other plaintiffs who allege a similar defect in
cases involving the same or similar vehicles. The other plaintiffs receiving
the information, under the terms of the order, are bound not to disseminate
it outside of the context of their lawsuits.
This arrangement has several benefits. First, it allows similar
litigation to proceed without reinventing the wheel with similar discovery
disputes in each case.219 Second, it allows parties requesting discovery to
compare responses and detect evasive or fraudulent discovery
responses.220 Indeed, the existence of sharing orders in a case might deter
discovery misconduct in similar cases. Third, it allows plaintiff attorneys
(who often work alone or in small groups) to collaborate and strategize
because they can reveal discovery information to one another.
Some of these benefits are not fully realized by the other discovery
sharing mechanism: intervention and modification. To understand the
process, imagine that the protective order entered in the case described
supra did not have an upfront sharing provision. But also imagine that
litigants and attorneys in other similar cases learned of the first case and
suspected that documents produced in that case were relevant to their own
cases. The litigant in the first case would be prohibited from disseminating
the discovery. Another party, however, could seek to intervene and
modify the protective order in the first case to allow discovery in that case
to be shared. Many courts favor modification and intervention to upfront
sharing provisions.221
A proper understanding of good cause, however, requires upfront
discovery sharing in many instances. This is because orders that forbid
sharing are often overbroad. Indeed, the denial of upfront sharing simply
does not serve the asserted confidentiality interest and allowing sharing
causes no harm to the party seeking the order.222 Returning to the previous

219. See, e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982)
(asserting that denying sharing between litigants “would be tantamount to holding that
each litigant who wishes to ride a taxi to court must undertake the expense of inventing
the wheel”).
220. See Peeples, 734 S.W.2d at 347 (“Shared discovery is an effective means to
insure full and fair disclosure. Parties subject to a number of suits concerning the same
subject matter are forced to be consistent in their responses by the knowledge that their
opponents can compare those responses.”); see also Benham, supra note 8, at, 2207.
221. Cf. Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979)
(mandating “extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to modify protective
order); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that
collateral litigants in similar cases are “presumptively entitled to access” protected
discovery), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir.
2009).
222. Cf. Benham, supra note 8, at 2227–29.
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example: the interest asserted in keeping automotive designs confidential
is usually a proprietary or competitive interest. The automaker asserts that
the information has value by virtue of it being secret and that, if it is shared
with competitors, the information will lose its value and injure the
producing automaker.
But the problem with using this logic to forbid sharing orders is that
injured plaintiffs are almost certainly not competing automakers.223 They
desire the information to prepare and try their lawsuits, not to build
competing automobiles. They are also prohibited by the terms of the
sharing order from disseminating the information. There is at least some
possibility that expanding the audience for the discovery materials to
include plaintiffs with similar suits increases, by some degree, the chances
of a protective-order breach increase to some degree.224 But considering
the prevalence of protective orders, breaches are exceedingly infrequent.
Thus, restricting the flow of information to all but similar plaintiffs serves
no legitimate purpose.
Non-sharing orders subject to later intervention and modification are
also less desirable than upfront sharing for practical reasons. First,
non-sharing orders do not yield the full litigation efficiency benefits of
upfront sharing orders. Upfront sharing obviates the need for most
additional disputes about sharing information between cases.225 On the
other hand, non-sharing protective orders tee up sharing fights via future
intervention-and-modification proceedings. They consume party and
court resources for each instance in which an intervening party seeks
access to existing discovery. Second, non-sharing orders have a reduced
deterrent effect for discovery misconduct. Upfront sharing orders present
an enhanced possibility that inconsistent discovery responses will be
detected, because previous responses will be shared with a wider audience
of litigants. For doctrinal and pragmatic reasons, upfront sharing
provisions should be available in most protective orders. In many cases,
good cause does not exist to deny sharing, and in those cases the orders
violate Rule 26 and the First Amendment.

223. Cf., e.g., Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 337 (N.M. 2008)
(“Ordinarily a protective order should permit discovery sharing among other litigants
and witnesses, who are not competitors of the defendant. . . .” (emphasis added)).
224. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 824 (contending that the likelihood of
protective-order violations increases with each disclosure of discovery information).
225. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (mandating the Rules “be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding”).
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b. Umbrella Orders

Umbrella protective orders are ubiquitous in complex litigation.226
The orders effectively delegate the court’s Rule 26(c) power to the parties
by allowing them to designate, without further court intervention, which
materials are confidential and subject to the order.227 Among court
confidentiality devices, umbrella orders play an outsized role in expanding
the breadth of materials kept from public view.
I have previously contended that, absent a stipulation, umbrella
orders do not satisfy Rule 26(c)’s good-cause standard.228 The orders are
often entered at the beginning of the case and before discovery is
exchanged. Indeed, they are often entered before all discovery requests
have been made. Thus, the party seeking umbrella protection has not even
identified the information it will produce. In such circumstances, how
could a party establish, through particularized proof, that failure to enter a
confidentiality order would impose substantial harm, as the good-cause
standard requires? And how could courts, on sparse or non-existent
factual records about hypothetical harm from the disclosure of yet-to-beidentified information, evaluate the good-cause factors? A court may have
little to no information about the public health and safety effects of
discovery information at the time it is asked to enter an agreed umbrella
order.
In the umbrella-order context, courts rely on parties to make good
faith designations and to contest lacking confidentiality designations. Yet,
as discussed supra, parties have little incentive to contest overbroad
confidentiality. Umbrella orders are essentially a tacit recognition that
confidentiality is the default. A better system, as discussed supra, would
forbid private agreement and require court involvement in confidentiality
determinations.229 Commentators have described umbrella orders as close
to essential for a functioning discovery regime and that eliminating them
would flood courts with work.230 But alternative systems are feasible.
Protective orders should be requested, considered, and entered in the
context of actual discovery requests and responses, not generalized
hypothetical proof. At one end of the good-cause proof spectrum,
generalizations and speculation by a moving party do not support a

226. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 9.
227. Cf., e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427
(10th Cir. 1990).
228. Benham, supra note 6, at 1826.
229. See supra Section III.B.
230. Cf. Marcus, supra note 15, at 500 (“The absence of careful scrutiny by the
court is precisely the objective of the umbrella order, which is designed to facilitate
discovery without miring the court or the parties in disputes about what is confidential.
That task could be daunting in a case with large volumes of documents.”).
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protective order.231 At the other end, courts might literally review all the
information that would be subject to the order. This does not mean,
however, that courts must turn every page in a one-million-page document
production to assess whether there is good cause for an order. To the
contrary, when a party moves for a protective order based on actual
discovery responses, it can provide granular proof in the form of live or
affidavit testimony about categories of information produced, sworn
summaries, or – potentially – technology-assisted review.
Technology, indeed, has created part of the problem in this context
(an explosion of discoverable material), but technology may also solve the
problem. Courts have approved predictive coding and machine learning
as a method to determine whether information is responsive to discovery
requests.232 Perhaps a similar method could be employed to reliably assess
whether material ought to be confidential.233 Even short of that,
technology has made party and court review of vast amounts of
information more feasible.234 These gains would benefit a protective-order
process that employs heightened court involvement.
If courts are required to make protective-order determinations on an
evidentiary basis, many umbrella requests will fail. But this means that
courts will be able to adequately account for the public and First
231. See, e.g., Gelb v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 813 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“With respect to [a] claim of confidential business information, [the goodcause] standard demands that the company prove that disclosure will result in a clearly
defined and very serious injury to its business.”); Parsons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85
F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding the “good-cause” requirement “to mean that
the party seeking the protective order must demonstrate that the material sought to be
protected is confidential and that disclosure will create a competitive disadvantage for
the party”).
232. See City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., 326 F.R.D. 489, 496 (N.D.
Ill. 2018) (upholding TAR ESI production protocol as reasonable); see also, e.g.,
Jacob Tingen, Technologies-That-Must-Not-Be-Named: Understanding and
Implementing Advanced Search Technologies in E-Discovery, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
2, 37 (2012) (“[C]onceptual searches find documents based on their relevance or
similarity to the ideas expressed in the search query.”); Charles Yablon & Nick
Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 633, 637–42 (2013).
233. Cf. Manfred Gabriel, Chris Paskach, & David Sharpe, The Challenge and
Promise of Predictive Coding for Privilege, ICAIL (June 14, 2013),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/aa13/dc9888c3913c308c1cd4319cec1571e6e3f2.pdf
(exploring potential and limitations of technology assisted privilege review).
234. “Technology Assisted Review (TAR) is a process of having computer
software electronically classify documents based on input from expert reviewers, in
an effort to expedite the organization and prioritization of the document collection.
The computer classification may include broad topics pertaining to discovery
responsiveness, privilege, and other designated issues.” Technology Assisted Review,
EDRM,
https://www.edrm.net/resources/frameworks-and-standards/technologyassisted-review/ [https://perma.cc/3ZFA-KXC7] (last visited June 2, 2020).
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Amendment interests at stake in the process, through the proper
application of Rule 26(c) or sunshine laws.

D. Limitations on Sealing Judicial Records
Judicial records, unlike unfiled discovery, are subject to a
presumption of public access.235 This presumption flows from the
common law and the First Amendment, though there is some uncertainty
as to the nature and degree of the First Amendment right.236 In describing
the common law right, the Supreme Court noted that access is necessary
to allow the public to keep a “watchful eye” on government. 237 The
presumption of public access is not absolute, however. While no rule
expressly grants courts authority, they have inherent supervisory power to
seal court files.
But sealing judicial records must occur only after courts have made
specific findings, on the record, that some “higher value[]” overcomes the
presumption of access.238 Possible interests that can weigh in favor of
sealing include trade secret or proprietary concerns.239 Moreover, courts
have authority to limit access to information that may have been placed in
their files to “gratify private spite or promote public scandal.”240 Even if
a party seeking to seal judicial records identifies a valid higher interest, the
sealing order should be narrowly constructed to serve the asserted
interest.241
Just because a document – paper or electronic – is placed in a court
file, however, does not mean that it is a “judicial record,” subject to the
right of access.242 The sealing question becomes more complex when
parties attach unfiled discovery (afforded no presumption of access) as

235. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)
(recognizing the common law right of access); see also, e.g., Bernstein v. Bernstein,
814 F.3d 132, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that complaint was subject to First
Amendment right of access).
236. Cf., e.g., Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 141 (acknowledging two distinct rationales
underpinning First Amendment right of access); Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087,
1091–96 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing the limits of the First Amendment right and
declining to extend it to classified national security information filed in court); cf. also
1 JAMES WM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 5.34 (2020).
237. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
238. See, e.g., Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2019).
239. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Grover v. Related Companies, LP, 4 F. Supp. 3d 21, 25
(D.D.C. 2013) (“Public access may be denied, however, to protect trade secrets . . .”).
240. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
241. See, e.g., Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2019).
242. See, e.g., Dhiab, 852 F.3d at 1091–96.
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exhibits to motions and other court papers.243 This material is routinely
attached to discovery motions. But unfiled discovery documents –
including discovery already deemed confidential and subject to a
protective order – are also routinely filed as exhibits to merits-related
motions.244 This includes motions for summary judgment, motions for
preliminary injunction, and motions in limine.245 Many sealing disputes
revolve around whether filed discovery documents, along with motions
and court opinions that reference them, are “judicial records” subject to
the presumption of access.
Most courts agree that most pure discovery motions, and related
exhibits, are not judicial records subject to a strong presumption of public
access.246 By “pure discovery motion,” I mean motions where the sole
issue before the court is whether information should be disclosed in
discovery or whether a protective order should be issued to keep it
secret.247 More than one court has observed that these motions “play no
role in the performance of Article III functions” and thus are not subject
to an access presumption.248
This rationale falls short in at least some cases. Some of the most
important decisions in the Article III system involve pretrial discovery –
who will be forced to testify at deposition, which documents are
privileged, and which will be produced in a case of public importance.
Discovery rulings are so central to contemporary litigation that they can
end cases or force them to settle. A plaintiff, facing information
asymmetry, may lose a case at the dispositive motion stage because she
was deprived – by court action – of access to proof at the discovery stage.
Likewise, a defendant who faces a production order that would undermine
some greater proprietary or reputational interest may settle to avoid
producing the information.
243. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1095,
1102–03 (9th Cir. 2016) (evaluating whether right of access attached to motion for
preliminary injunction and attached discovery documents).
244. See, e.g., Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 47 (sealed motion for summary judgment and
exhibits); cf. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 939 (6th Cir. 2019)
(e.g., sealed pleadings and brief).
245. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1095 (motion for preliminary
injunction); Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 47 (summary judgment).
246. Cf., e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097
(9th Cir. 2016). (“Despite this strong preference for public access, we have carved out
an exception for sealed materials attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the merits
of a case.”) (internal quotes omitted).
247. See, e.g., Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 50 n.33 (“[W]e have identified an important
exception to [the] general rule: the presumption of public access does not apply to
material that is submitted to the court solely so that the court may decide whether that
same material must be disclosed in the discovery process or shielded by a Protective
Order.”).
248. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001).
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A better rationale for not affording pure discovery motions a strong
presumption of public access is a pragmatic one: If courts were forced to
allow public access to discovery motion materials – especially those
submitted on camera for review – they would lose the power to protect
those materials from disclosure. Still, there may be circumstances where
discovery decisions, and the materials that putatively support them, are of
such consequence that the presumption should attach.
Outside of the discovery motion context, some court filings, like
summary judgment motions and exhibits, are plainly connected to the
exercise of judicial power.249 Accordingly, the presumption of public
access ordinarily attaches, and courts should seal the filings only if
substantial countervailing concerns overcome it.250 But courts have, at
times, struggled to determine whether the presumption attaches to other
motions. For a time, some courts evaluated whether motions were
“dispositive” or “non-dispositive” to determine whether they warranted a
public access right.251
The Ninth Circuit recently rejected this binary approach.252 In Center
for Auto Safety v. Chrysler, plaintiffs in a defective-auto class action filed
a motion for preliminary injunction to require an automaker to notify
potential class members of alleged safety risks.253 A public-interest group
sought to intervene to unseal the filing.254 The district court denied the
request, relying on cases holding that non-dispositive motions and exhibits
can be sealed on a showing of good cause. 255 The trial court noted the
difficulty in distinguishing between dispositive and non-dispositive
motions.256 Nonetheless, the court found that granting the motion for
preliminary injunction would not award the ultimate relief sought in the
249. Cf., e.g., Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 47 (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006)) (“With respect to the first category of
materials, it is well-settled that documents submitted to a court for its consideration in
a summary judgment motion are – as a matter of law – judicial documents to which a
strong presumption of access attaches, under both the common law and the First
Amendment.”) (internal quotations omitted).
250. See, e.g., Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206,
1212 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[S]trong presumption in favor of access . . . can be overcome”
only by showing sufficiently important countervailing interests.) (internal quotations
omitted).
251. See, e.g., id. at 1213 (“[W]hen a party attaches a sealed discovery document
to a nondispositive motion, the usual presumption of the public’s right of access is
rebutted, so that the party seeking disclosure must present sufficiently compelling
reasons why the sealed discovery document should be released.”).
252. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097–99 (9th
Cir. 2016).
253. See id. at 1095.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 1096.
256. See id. at 1095–96.
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case, and the motion was therefore non-dispositive.257 Accordingly, the
district court applied the good-cause standard to sustain its sealing order,
keeping the documents attached to the motion from public view.258
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the presumption of public
access does not depend on any rigid distinction between dispositive and
non-dispositive motions.259 In doing so, the court emphasized the
underlying rationale for the presumption, noting that it is “based on the
need for federal courts, although independent – indeed, particularly
because they are independent – to have a measure of accountability and
for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.”260 Tying
its analysis to this rationale, the court observed that “[m]ost litigation in a
case is not literally ‘dispositive,’ but nevertheless involves important
issues and information to which our case law demands the public should
have access.”261
Noting apparent problems with the binary approach to the
presumption, the court clarified, or perhaps announced, a test that looked
to the substance of the filing at issue. Instead of focusing on whether a
motion is dispositive, courts should focus on whether “the motion at issue
is more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action” or
“merits.”262 Finding that the motion for preliminary injunction was
technically non-dispositive, the court then evaluated whether it was more
than tangentially related to the merits.263 The court held that it was.264 The
plaintiffs’ complaint included a request for injunctive relief that, if
granted, would have constituted a change in the status quo and a resolution
of at least part of the claims. Accordingly, the motion was merits-related,
and the presumption applied to it and any accompanying exhibits. The
court remanded to the district court to determine whether the materials
should remain sealed under the more stringent compelling reasons
standard.265
The Chrysler court’s approach is sensible, particularly when
compared to the binary approach, because it connects the public-access
presumption to its foundation – the public’s need to observe the court’s
workings on most matters. The court noted that the test reaches filings
257. See id.
258. See id. at 1095.
259. See id. at 1097–99.
260. Id. at 1096 (internal quotations omitted).
261. Id. at 1098.
262. See id. at 1099.
263. In a concurrence, Judge Sessions wrote separately that he would have found
that, even under the binary approach, the motion for preliminary injunction was
literally dispositive. Thus, the presumption of access would have attached. See id. at
1103 (Sessions, J., concurring).
264. See id. at 1102–03.
265. See id. at 1103.
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beyond the summary-judgment context, like motions in limine and
Daubert motions.
But the test, in application, may fall short to the extent courts use the
phrase “only tangentially related to the merits” to withhold the
presumption from those seeking access to discovery-related motions. For
example, a discovery sanctions motion may resolve part or all of a case by
dismissing it. Likewise, as discussed supra, the grant or denial of a motion
to compel discovery may as a practical matter result in a case settling or
being dismissed. Careful application of the more-than-tangentiallyrelated-to-the-merits standard would consider the gravity and likely
consequences of the court’s action. If it has the potential to resolve part
of the case, directly or through likely consequence, the presumption should
attach to the filings involved. Of course, countervailing considerations –
like privilege, proprietary, or privacy concerns – might very well justify
sealing.
Some courts have also withheld, or devalued, the presumption for
summary-judgment papers in instances in which the court denied the
summary judgment.266 A recent case related to the Jeffrey Epstein sexabuse matter addressed this issue.267 The case, a defamation action against
an Epstein associate, involved salacious allegations of misconduct made
against prominent individuals.268 Discovery in the case was hotly
contested and motion practice was extensive. The district court entered a
sealing order that effectively delegated the sealing power to the parties, in
an order that resembled, in some respects, an umbrella order.269
In all, 167 filings were sealed, nearly one-fifth of the entire docket.
These included motions for summary judgment, adverse inference
instructions, motions in limine, and discovery-related motions. The media
intervened, seeking to unseal the material, the district court denied the
request, and the media appealed.270
The Second Circuit reversed, unsealed the summary judgment
record, and remanded for the district court to properly consider the
presumption for the remaining material.271 In the process, the court held
that the district court erred by not applying the presumption to the
266. Cf., e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“As
one moves along the continuum, the weight of the presumption declines. One judge
has pointed out, for example, that where a district court ‘denied the summary judgment
motion, essentially postponing a final determination of substantive legal rights,’ the
public interest in access ‘is not as pressing.’”) (quoting In re Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1342 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wright, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
267. See Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 41.
268. See id. at 45–46.
269. See id. at 46.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 53–54.
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summary judgment record. The district court had reasoned that the
presumption did not fully apply to materials filed in connection with a
denied summary judgment or to documents that the district court did not
rely upon in reaching its decision.272 The appellate court disagreed on both
fronts, holding that both the presumption of public access – emanating
from both the First Amendment and common law – should have been
afforded full weight. Moreover, the court held that the district court’s
failure to make factual findings in support of sealing order doomed its
order.273
With respect to the remaining documents, the court made clear that
the presumption should apply to all items “relevant to the performance of
the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.”274 The weight
given to the presumption, however, “must be governed by the role of the
material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the
resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal
courts.”275 Addressing the degree of weight to be afforded the
presumption in different contexts, the court went on to note that “the
presumption of public access in filings submitted in connection with
discovery disputes or motions in limine is generally somewhat lower than
the presumption applied to material introduced at trial, in connection with
dispositive motions such as motions for dismissal or summary
judgment.”276 As such, the reasons needed to seal such materials need not
be as compelling as the reasons that would sustain sealing of a dispositive
motion. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for the court to
conduct an individualized review.277
The case offers a few important lessons. First, umbrella-style sealing
orders are fatally flawed. Courts should conduct individualized review
before sealing judicial records. Second, all filed materials – even
discovery motions – that are relevant to the court’s exercise of judicial
power should be afforded the presumption of public access. The weight
of this presumption may vary by the strength of connection of the material
to the judicial function. An interpretation of the public access right that is
at least this broad is probably correct.
The court went on to note that, as the Court noted in Nixon, there is
some danger that court files become publicly accessible repositories of
libelous material.278 To counter this, courts should not reflexively seal
material, but should instead rely on other powers. Indeed, courts may
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See id. at 48.
See id.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 53–54.
See id.
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explain problems with the credibility of the proof on the record, they may
strike material from the record utilizing Rule 12(f) on the basis that it is
“immaterial” or “scandalous,” or (in certain circumstances) courts may
sanction litigants for false filings.279
Sealing as a default, automatic procedure to protect the interests of
litigants is not sustainable. Instead, courts should carefully examine the
record, detail their findings, and balance any asserted interest in sealing
against a properly weighted presumption of public access.

IV. CONCLUSION
After decades of debate, court confidentiality continues to keep
information from the public and regulators. This information, in some
cases, would prevent injury, save lives, or improve the function of
government. For various reasons, the solutions proposed so far have either
lacked overwhelming political support or, when adopted, not gone far
enough. Any sunshine law or other reform must adequately account for
the actual player incentives in litigation. Reform must also take special
account of the public role of courts and recognize that the taint from courtconfidentiality scandals undermines the legitimacy of courts. The public
is rightfully hesitant to accept the explanation that courts are just not all
that involved in discovery or private confidentiality agreements.
Perhaps one of the most important lessons of the past forty years is
that protective orders and sealing orders are speech restraints. And the
First Amendment should play a bigger role than it currently does in
regulating them. Moreover, the convenient practice of umbrella protective
orders should be curtailed. Feasible alternatives exist, and any increased
burden on courts is justified in pursuit of court legitimacy and public
safety. Appellate courts that have recently resisted overbroad sealing in
high profile cases deserve credit. But district courts – and courts
overseeing MDLs in particular – should pay heed to the message: Easy
confidentiality in pretrial discovery should not give way to relaxed
burdens when sealing court records.

279. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 51–53.
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